ScatterVerif:利用配电网反射响应对电路板进行验证

IF 2.1 4区 计算机科学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE
Tahoura Mosavirik, Fatemeh Ganji, Patrick Schaumont, Shahin Tajik
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引用次数: 0

摘要

电子系统制造的全球化使得我们的一些最关键的系统容易受到供应链攻击。在印刷电路板(pcb)上植入间谍芯片或用假冒/回收的组件替换正品组件都是此类攻击的例子。不幸的是,传统的pcb攻击检测方案是临时的、昂贵的、不可扩展的,而且容易出错。这项工作介绍了pcb的整体物理验证框架,称为ScatterVerif,基于pcb配电网络的特征。首先,我们展示了经常用于射频电路阻抗表征的散射参数如何通过一次测量来表征整个PCB。其次,我们介绍了一类机器学习算法,即高斯混合模型,如何应用于测量,以自动分类/聚类正品和篡改/假冒pcb。我们表明,这些攻击在不同频率范围内对PCB的整体阻抗影响不同,因此使用恒频电刺激的传统阻抗测量可能会使攻击未被检测到。我们对伪造和篡改的设备进行了广泛的实验,并证明可以高可信度地检测到这些攻击。最后,我们证明了从配电网络特性中获得的数据也可以用于指纹识别正品pcb。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
ScatterVerif: Verification of Electronic Boards Using Reflection Response of Power Distribution Network

The globalization of electronic systems’ fabrication has made some of our most critical systems vulnerable to supply chain attacks. Implanting spy chips on the printed circuit boards (PCBs) or replacing genuine components with counterfeit/recycled ones are examples of such attacks. Unfortunately, conventional attack detection schemes for PCBs are ad hoc, costly, unscalable, and error prone. This work introduces a holistic physical verification framework for PCBs, called ScatterVerif, based on the characterization of the PCBs’ power distribution network. First, we demonstrate how scattering parameters, frequently used for impedance characterization of RF circuits, can characterize the entire PCB with a single measurement. Second, we present how a class of machine learning algorithms, namely the Gaussian mixture model, can be applied to the measurements to automatically classify/cluster the genuine and tampered/counterfeit PCBs. We show that these attacks affect the overall impedance of a PCB differently in various frequency ranges, hence the conventional impedance measurements using a constant-frequency electrical stimulus might leave the attack undetected. We conduct extensive experiments on counterfeit and tampered devices and demonstrate that these attacks can be detected with high confidence. Finally, we show that the acquired data from the power distribution network characterization can also be deployed for fingerprinting genuine PCBs.

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来源期刊
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
4.50%
发文量
86
审稿时长
3 months
期刊介绍: The Journal of Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems invites submissions of original technical papers describing research and development in emerging technologies in computing systems. Major economic and technical challenges are expected to impede the continued scaling of semiconductor devices. This has resulted in the search for alternate mechanical, biological/biochemical, nanoscale electronic, asynchronous and quantum computing and sensor technologies. As the underlying nanotechnologies continue to evolve in the labs of chemists, physicists, and biologists, it has become imperative for computer scientists and engineers to translate the potential of the basic building blocks (analogous to the transistor) emerging from these labs into information systems. Their design will face multiple challenges ranging from the inherent (un)reliability due to the self-assembly nature of the fabrication processes for nanotechnologies, from the complexity due to the sheer volume of nanodevices that will have to be integrated for complex functionality, and from the need to integrate these new nanotechnologies with silicon devices in the same system. The journal provides comprehensive coverage of innovative work in the specification, design analysis, simulation, verification, testing, and evaluation of computing systems constructed out of emerging technologies and advanced semiconductors
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