候选人受欢迎程度信息对规避损失选民弃权的影响

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS

Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-01-11 DOI:10.1007/s40505-021-00214-y

Kohei Daido, Tomoya Tajika

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在本研究中，我们建立了一个双候选人选举模型，在这个模型中，选民是损失厌恶的，并且面临着他们喜欢的候选人是否得到大多数人支持的不确定性。即使没有投票成本，当选民有基于预期的参考依赖偏好时，弃权也可能发生，如Kőszegi和Rabin (Q J Econ 121:1133-1165, 2006;Am economics Rev 97:1047-1073, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1047, 2007)。我们证明了损失厌恶导致在大型选举中出现弃权的均衡，并且倾向于少数候选人的选民的弃权率高于倾向于多数候选人的选民。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Impact of Information Concerning the Popularity of Candidates on Loss-Averse Voters’ Abstention

In this study, we build a two-candidate election model, in which voters are loss averse and face uncertainty about whether their preferred candidate is supported by a majority. Even without costs for voting, abstention may occur when voters have expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, as in Kőszegi and Rabin (Q J Econ 121:1133–1165, 2006; Am Econ Rev 97:1047–1073, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1047, 2007). We show that loss aversion leads to the equilibrium wherein abstention occurs in a large election, and the abstention rate of voters who prefer the minority candidate is higher than that of voters who prefer the majority candidate.

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来源期刊

Economic Theory Bulletin ECONOMICS-

自引率

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期刊介绍： The purpose of Economic Theory Bulletin is to provide an outlet for research in all areas of Economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning. The Economic Theory Bulletin together with Economic Theory are the official journals of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. The Economic Theory Bulletin is intended to publish: 1. Short papers/notes of substantial interest. Content is subject to the same standards as Economic Theory: research in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning and on topics in mathematics that are supported by the analysis of economic problems. Published articles contribute to the understanding and solution of substantive economic problems. Theory papers with the substance and style for other journals that specialize in short papers are welcomed. Corollaries of already known results in the literature are not appropriate for publication. 2. Survey papers that clearly picture the basic ideas at work in the area, the essential technical apparatus that is used and the central questions that remain open.