对信息的理性厌恶

arXiv - STAT - Other Statistics Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI:arxiv-2309.12374

Sven Neth

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引用次数: 0

摘要

信息越多越好吗?或者在某些情况下，更多的信息会让我们变得更糟?Good(1966)认为，如果信息是无成本和相关的，预期效用最大化者应该总是接受更多的信息。但是Good的论点预设了你确定你会通过条件化来更新。如果我们放宽这一假设，允许代理对更新不确定，这些代理就可以合理地拒绝自由和相关的信息。既然有充分的理由对更新不确定，理性可能要求你更喜欢无知。

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Rational Aversion to Information

Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1966) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance.

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arXiv - STAT - Other Statistics

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