约束知识

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Ben Holguín
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考虑了一些令人困惑的知识归属,并认为它们为知识的信任、信念和证明条件以及关于“知道”的上下文敏感性的许多标准元语义假设提供了初步的反例。它认为,这些归属为知识的语境主义理论提供了新的证据,特别是那些对“知道”的解释敏感于约束机制的理论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Knowledge by constraint
This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta-semantic assumptions about the context-sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sensitive to the mechanisms of constraint.
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CiteScore
1.50
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