证明微架构时间通道的缺失

arXiv - CS - Operating Systems Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI:arxiv-2310.17046

Scott BuckleyUNSW Sydney, Robert SisonUNSW SydneyUniversity of Melbourne, Nils WistoffETH Zürich, Curtis MillarUNSW Sydney, Toby MurrayUniversity of Melbourne, Gerwin KleinProofcraftUNSW Sydney, Gernot HeiserUNSW Sydney

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引用次数: 0

摘要

微体系结构定时信道是对计算机安全的主要威胁。一套称为时间保护的操作系统机制最近被提出，作为防止通过这些通道泄露信息的原则方法，并在seL4微内核中原型化。我们将时间保护和底层硬件机制形式化，以允许将它们链接到显示seL4中缺乏存储通道的信息流证明。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Proving the Absence of Microarchitectural Timing Channels

Microarchitectural timing channels are a major threat to computer security. A set of OS mechanisms called time protection was recently proposed as a principled way of preventing information leakage through such channels and prototyped in the seL4 microkernel. We formalise time protection and the underlying hardware mechanisms in a way that allows linking them to the information-flow proofs that showed the absence of storage channels in seL4.

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arXiv - CS - Operating Systems

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