Laccolith:基于管理程序的对手仿真与反检测

Vittorio Orbinato, Marco Carlo Feliciano, Domenico Cotroneo, Roberto Natella
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引用次数: 0

摘要

高级持续性威胁(apt)是当今最具威胁性的攻击形式,因为它们可以在很长一段时间内不被发现。对手模拟是针对这些攻击进行准备的主动方法。然而,对手模拟工具缺乏apt的反检测能力。我们引入Laccolith,这是一种基于管理程序的解决方案,用于对手模拟和反检测,以填补这一空白。我们还提出了一项实验研究,将Laccolith与MITRE CALDERA(对抗仿真的最先进解决方案)与五种流行的杀毒产品进行比较。我们发现,即使与最先进的反检测框架相结合,caldera也无法逃避检测,从而限制了模拟攻击的真实性。我们的实验表明,Laccolith可以对所有被测试的杀毒产品隐藏其活性,从而使其适合于真实的模拟。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Laccolith: Hypervisor-Based Adversary Emulation with Anti-Detection
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent the most threatening form of attack nowadays since they can stay undetected for a long time. Adversary emulation is a proactive approach for preparing against these attacks. However, adversary emulation tools lack the anti-detection abilities of APTs. We introduce Laccolith, a hypervisor-based solution for adversary emulation with anti-detection to fill this gap. We also present an experimental study to compare Laccolith with MITRE CALDERA, a state-of-the-art solution for adversary emulation, against five popular anti-virus products. We found that CALDERA cannot evade detection, limiting the realism of emulated attacks, even when combined with a state-of-the-art anti-detection framework. Our experiments show that Laccolith can hide its activities from all the tested anti-virus products, thus making it suitable for realistic emulations.
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