{"title":"英语竞投的鉴定","authors":"Guillermo Marshall","doi":"10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.</p>","PeriodicalId":501397,"journal":{"name":"Quantitative Marketing and Economics","volume":"59 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Identification in english auctions with shill bidding\",\"authors\":\"Guillermo Marshall\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":501397,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quantitative Marketing and Economics\",\"volume\":\"59 6\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quantitative Marketing and Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quantitative Marketing and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Identification in english auctions with shill bidding
What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.
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