科学归因市场

Joshua S Gans, Fiona Murray
{"title":"科学归因市场","authors":"Joshua S Gans, Fiona Murray","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Formal attribution provides a means of recognizing scientific contributions as well as allocating scientific credit. This article examines the processes by which attribution arises and its interaction with market assessments of the relative contributions of members of scientific teams and communities—a topic of interest for the organizational economics of science and in understanding scientific labor markets. We demonstrate that a pioneer or senior scientist’s decision to co-author with a follower or junior scientist depends critically on market attributions as well as the timing of the co-authoring decision. This results in multiple equilibrium outcomes each with different implications for expected quality of research projects. However, we demonstrate that the Pareto efficient organizational regime is for the follower researcher to be granted co-authorship contingent on their own performance without any earlier pre-commitment to formal attribution. We then compare this with the alternative for the pioneer of publishing their contribution and being rewarded through citations. While in some equilibria (especially where co-authoring commitments are possible) there is no advantage to interim publication, in others this can increase expected research quality. (JEL O31; O36)","PeriodicalId":501404,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Markets for Scientific Attribution\",\"authors\":\"Joshua S Gans, Fiona Murray\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/jleo/ewac007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Formal attribution provides a means of recognizing scientific contributions as well as allocating scientific credit. This article examines the processes by which attribution arises and its interaction with market assessments of the relative contributions of members of scientific teams and communities—a topic of interest for the organizational economics of science and in understanding scientific labor markets. We demonstrate that a pioneer or senior scientist’s decision to co-author with a follower or junior scientist depends critically on market attributions as well as the timing of the co-authoring decision. This results in multiple equilibrium outcomes each with different implications for expected quality of research projects. However, we demonstrate that the Pareto efficient organizational regime is for the follower researcher to be granted co-authorship contingent on their own performance without any earlier pre-commitment to formal attribution. We then compare this with the alternative for the pioneer of publishing their contribution and being rewarded through citations. While in some equilibria (especially where co-authoring commitments are possible) there is no advantage to interim publication, in others this can increase expected research quality. (JEL O31; O36)\",\"PeriodicalId\":501404,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization\",\"volume\":\"61 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-06-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

正式署名提供了一种承认科学贡献以及分配科学信用的方法。本文考察了归因产生的过程及其与科学团队和社区成员相对贡献的市场评估的相互作用——这是科学组织经济学和理解科学劳动力市场感兴趣的主题。我们证明,先驱或资深科学家与追随者或初级科学家合著的决定主要取决于市场因素以及合著决定的时机。这导致了多种均衡结果,每种结果对研究项目的预期质量都有不同的含义。然而,我们证明了帕累托有效的组织机制是追随者研究者根据自己的表现被授予共同作者身份,而无需事先承诺正式归属。然后,我们将其与发表其贡献并通过引用获得奖励的先驱的替代方案进行比较。虽然在某些平衡中(特别是在可能有共同作者承诺的情况下),中期发表没有优势,但在其他平衡中,这可以提高预期的研究质量。(凝胶O31;O36)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Markets for Scientific Attribution
Formal attribution provides a means of recognizing scientific contributions as well as allocating scientific credit. This article examines the processes by which attribution arises and its interaction with market assessments of the relative contributions of members of scientific teams and communities—a topic of interest for the organizational economics of science and in understanding scientific labor markets. We demonstrate that a pioneer or senior scientist’s decision to co-author with a follower or junior scientist depends critically on market attributions as well as the timing of the co-authoring decision. This results in multiple equilibrium outcomes each with different implications for expected quality of research projects. However, we demonstrate that the Pareto efficient organizational regime is for the follower researcher to be granted co-authorship contingent on their own performance without any earlier pre-commitment to formal attribution. We then compare this with the alternative for the pioneer of publishing their contribution and being rewarded through citations. While in some equilibria (especially where co-authoring commitments are possible) there is no advantage to interim publication, in others this can increase expected research quality. (JEL O31; O36)
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信