养老基金董事会治理与资产配置:来自瑞士的证据

IF 1 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Nadège Bregnard, Carolina Salva
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了养老基金董事会治理是否与资产配置有关。管理良好的董事会的养老基金具有更大的国际多元化,现金持有量更低,而且,当养老基金规模较小时,更多地投资于风险资产。特别是,制定综合投资政策的养老基金理事会,更多地投资于股票和外国资产,而持有的现金较少。我们认为,一项全面的投资政策可能会作为基金可用的金融专业知识的代理,同时它提供了促进决策的设置。最后,我们进一步表明,外部金融专家的存在也与较低的现金持有量有关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pension fund board governance and asset allocation: evidence from Switzerland

We study whether pension fund board governance relates to asset allocation. Pension funds with well-governed boards have greater international diversification, lower cash holdings, and, when pension funds are small, invest more in risky assets. In particular, pension fund boards that establish comprehensive investment policies invest more in equities, in foreign assets, and hold less cash. We argue that a comprehensive investment policy is likely to serve as a proxy for the financial expertise available to the fund while it provides the set up to facilitate decision making. Finally, we further show that the presence of external financial experts is also associated with lower cash holdings.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.20
自引率
8.30%
发文量
29
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