The Question of Comparison

Comparison is a key component of legal reasoning. We move merrily from like to like within the doctrine of precedent. We invoke comparison whenever we distinguish or apply a case. This Article begins by elucidating how comparison is present in law. The Article shows how law cannot function without comparison, and how the legal world skips over the central role comparison plays in these matters. The Article explores the literature on legal comparison and draws on insights from philosophy, comparative law, and anthropology to better understand comparison in practice. This Article argues that while we are entangled in the questions of sameness and difference, of finding the function and tying together, we are still not asking the question of comparison. What is function and how is it related to comparison? Inspired by James Tully’s writings, the Article explores the aspectival views of the legal world suggested by the different games of comparison. The Article draws on Stephen Mulhall’s work on Wittgenstein’s seeing as, aspect dawning, and aspect blindness to further ask about our relationship to comparison. The Article shows how mainstream comparisons are ontic comparisons that think togetherness through the comparatist. The comparatist steers the belonging together and (un)makes the meaning of all things in mainstream comparison. The argument builds on earlier work by Igor Stramignoni, showing how the Western legal tradition is within a kind of Heideggerian calculative thinking. The Article explores the possibility of other kinds of comparison through Stramignoni’s poetic comparisons. This Article calls on us to slow down our comparisons and begin to question comparison itself.