代理冲突与投资:来自结构估计的证据

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2022-04-27 DOI:10.1093/rcfs/cfac019

Redouane Elkahmi, Daniel Kim, Chanik Jo, Marco Salerno

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文建立了一个动态资本结构模型，研究经理人和股东之间的代理冲突如何影响融资和投资决策的共同决策。研究发现，经理人的投资选择存在两种相反影响的代理冲突:一是私人利益渠道的消费导致经理人不仅选择较低的最优杠杆，而且投资不足;二是与企业规模挂钩的薪酬可能导致经理人过度投资。我们将模型拟合到数据中，结果表明，平均而言，公司的投资略过度，年轻的ceo比年长的ceo投资更多，而任期较长的ceo比任期较短的ceo投资更多。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Agency Conflicts and Investment: Evidence from a Structural Estimation

We develop a dynamic capital structure model to study how agency conflicts between managers and shareholders affect the joint determination of financing and investment decisions. We show that there are two agency conflicts with opposing effects on a manager’s choice of investment: first, the consumption of private benefits channel leads managers not only to choose a lower optimal leverage, but also to underinvest, and second, compensation linked to firm size may lead managers to overinvest. We fit the model to the data and show that the average firm slightly overinvests, younger CEOs invest more than older ones, while CEOs with longer tenure overinvest more than CEOs with shorter tenure.

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来源期刊

Review of Corporate Finance Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

17.80

自引率

1.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.