证券代币产品(sto)中的廉价信号

IF 3.2 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Lennart Ante,Ingo Fiedler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

基于区块链的证券型通证产品(sto)为众筹和企业融资提供了一种新的方式。代币可以立即转让,可以在二级市场上全天候交易,清算和结算只需几分钟,代币可以个人持有,即不再需要经纪人和托管账户,底层区块链确保所有交易的透明度。本研究概述了证券型代币和STO模型的企业融资。我们的分析从寻求融资的公司的角度调查了证券型代币。在信号理论的基础上,本文考察了1)进行STO的公司是否利用廉价信号来影响投资行为,以及2)这种廉价信号的使用是否有效。我们分析了151个sto的数据集,发现项目使用了人力资本和社交媒体的廉价信号,并对融资成功产生了积极影响。影响融资成功的信号类型表明,市场仍然不成熟,因为项目有明显的动机扩大它们与潜在投资者之间的不对称信息水平。滥用廉价信号的预期惩罚水平很低,因为该机制并不代表欺诈,而是“作弊”。这是对投资者保护的担忧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cheap signals in security token offerings (STOs)
Blockchain-based security token offerings (STOs) provide a new way of crowdfunding and corporate financing. Tokens are immediately transferable and can be traded 24/7 on secondary markets, clearing and settlement is a matter of only a few minutes, tokens can be held personally, i.e. brokers and custody accounts are no longer required and the underlying blockchain ensures transparency of all transactions. This study provides an overview of security tokens and the STO model for corporate financing. Our analysis investigates security tokens from the perspective of a firm looking to raise capital. Building on signaling theory, this paper examines 1) whether companies conducting an STO make use of cheap signals to influence investment behavior and 2) if such use of cheap signals is effective. We analyze a dataset of 151 STOs and identify that cheap signals of human capital and social media are used by projects and have a positive effect on funding success. The type of signals influencing funding success indicate that the market is still immature, as projects have a clear incentive to enlarge the level of asymmetric information between them and potential investors. The anticipated level of punishment for misusing cheap signaling is low, as the mechanism does not represent fraud but "cheating". This is a concern for investor protection.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
1.90%
发文量
14
审稿时长
12 weeks
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