首席执行官薪酬比率的显著性

IF 5.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Audra Boone, Austin Starkweather, Joshua T White
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引用次数: 0

摘要

美国证券交易委员会(sec)规定的首席执行官薪酬比率是一个简单但重要的指标,可能会引起员工的共鸣,因为它关注的是他们的薪酬。报告相对或高得惊人的比例会降低员工对薪酬的看法、对首席执行官的看法,并阻碍生产率的提高。在高比率披露后,员工的薪酬满意度下降,即使他们之前已经披露了工资,当薪酬比率披露增加的新信息很少时。高比率公司的披露包含更多的自由裁量语言来解释比率或积极描绘员工关系,并且更有可能被媒体报道。然而,这两个信息源都没有实质性地改变员工对显著比的反应。我们的研究表明,要求公司披露重要指标可能会对员工产生意想不到的后果,并建议在要求公司报告本质上是多方面的简化的环境、社会和治理(ESG)指标时要谨慎。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The saliency of the CEO pay ratio
The US Securities and Exchange Commission’s mandated CEO pay ratio is a simple, but salient, metric that could resonate with employees given it focuses on their compensation. Reporting a relatively or surprisingly high ratio reduces employee perceptions of their pay, views of the CEO, and hampers productivity growth. Employee pay satisfaction drops after disclosing a high ratio even if their wages were previously disclosed and when the pay ratio disclosure adds little new information. Disclosures by firms with a high ratio contain more discretionary language to explain the ratio or portray employee relations positively and are more likely to be covered by the media. However, neither information source substantially alters the employee response to a salient ratio. Our work illustrates that requiring firms to disclose a salient metric can have unintended consequences on employees and suggests caution in requiring firms to report simplified Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics that are inherently multifaceted.
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来源期刊
Review of Finance
Review of Finance Multiple-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
2.30%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: The Review of Finance, the official journal of the European Finance Association, aims at a wide circulation and visibility in the finance profession. The journal publishes high-quality papers in all areas of financial economics, both established and newly developing fields: • •Asset pricing •Corporate finance •Banking and market microstructure •Law and finance •Behavioral finance •Experimental finance Review of Finance occasionally publishes special issues on timely topics, including selected papers presented at the meetings of the European Finance Association or at other selected conferences in the field.
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