{"title":"当金融机构将具有信用风险的金融资产投放给散户投资者时，它们会起到激励作用","authors":"Ramiro Losada","doi":"10.1016/j.srfe.2013.03.002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes the conflict of interest that exists when a financial institution issues and places a financial asset with credit risk among retail investors. Four regulatory measures are presented and analyzed in order to improve retail investors protection. Theoretically, it is shown that two of these measures, setting a price cap to the issue and an adequate enforcement could implement a first best social optimum.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101250,"journal":{"name":"The Spanish Review of Financial Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":"Pages 1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.srfe.2013.03.002","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The financial institutions incentives when they place financial assets with credit risk to retail investors\",\"authors\":\"Ramiro Losada\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.srfe.2013.03.002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper analyzes the conflict of interest that exists when a financial institution issues and places a financial asset with credit risk among retail investors. Four regulatory measures are presented and analyzed in order to improve retail investors protection. Theoretically, it is shown that two of these measures, setting a price cap to the issue and an adequate enforcement could implement a first best social optimum.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101250,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Spanish Review of Financial Economics\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"Pages 1-12\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.srfe.2013.03.002\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Spanish Review of Financial Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2173126813000053\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Spanish Review of Financial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2173126813000053","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The financial institutions incentives when they place financial assets with credit risk to retail investors
This paper analyzes the conflict of interest that exists when a financial institution issues and places a financial asset with credit risk among retail investors. Four regulatory measures are presented and analyzed in order to improve retail investors protection. Theoretically, it is shown that two of these measures, setting a price cap to the issue and an adequate enforcement could implement a first best social optimum.
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