1979年至1981年1月,伊朗和阿富汗危机高峰期美国政治中的库尔德运动因素

IF 0.2 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
V. T. Yungblud, A. I. Sennikov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

1979年底,在伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·r·霍梅尼(Ayatollah R. Khomeini)的支持者于11月4日占领美国驻德黑兰大使馆以及随后于12月25日在阿富汗部署苏联军队之后,美国遇到了重新调整其中东战略的迫切需要。面对伊朗和阿富汗危机带来的挑战,美国的分析、情报和军事机构利用各种资源寻找可行的解决方案。本研究深入探讨了库尔德因素作为塑造区域景观的潜在工具的考虑。美国国家安全委员会(NSC)、国务院、中央情报局(CIA)和美国国防部都仔细审查了库尔德运动,评估了其促进美国利益的前景。根据从国务院、国家安全委员会和中央情报局获得的文件,本文追踪了美国关于库尔德运动的政策演变,以及在伊朗和阿富汗危机最关键阶段,它在实现华盛顿战略目标方面的作用。该分析强调了对阿富汗和伊朗事件的初步评估的根本缺陷,将它们误解为苏联将影响力扩展到波斯湾地区的战略中经过深思熟虑的举动。这种误解是卡特政府未能利用库尔德人作为对抗霍梅尼政权的力量的主要原因,也是卡特政府错误地认识到伊朗政治政权的脆弱性的主要原因。华盛顿与德黑兰关系的不一致阻碍了在阿富汗-伊朗问题上形成连贯一致的方针。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Kurdish Movement’s Factor in US Politics at the Peak of Iran and Afghanistan Crises, 1979 – January 1981
At the close of 1979, the United States encountered a critical need to realign its Middle East strategy in the wake of the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by supporters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah R. Khomeini on November 4, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 25. Faced with the challenges presented by the Iranian and Afghan crises, the United States' analytical, intelligence, and military bodies navigated various resources in search of viable solutions. This study delves into the consideration of the Kurdish factor as a potential instrument in shaping the regional landscape. The National Security Council (NSC), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the US Department of Defense all scrutinized the Kurdish movement, evaluating its prospects for advancing American interests. Drawing from documents obtained from the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, this article tracks the evolution of US policy concerning the Kurdish movement and its utility in realizing Washington's strategic objectives during the most critical phases of the Iran and Afghanistan crises. The analysis underscores the fundamental flaw in the initial evaluation of events in Afghanistan and Iran, misinterpreting them as a calculated move within a Soviet strategy to extend influence into the Persian Gulf region. This misconception was the primary cause of the Carter administration's failure in utilizing the Kurds as a counterforce against the Khomeini regime and its erroneous perceptions of the Iranian political regime's vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in Washington's relationship with Tehran hindered the formulation of a coherent approach toward the Afghan-Iranian direction.
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来源期刊
MGIMO Review of International Relations
MGIMO Review of International Relations INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
46
审稿时长
12 weeks
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