Guoxiang Li, Qingqing Zong, Xueli Chen, Malin Song
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Intergovernmental environmental affairs division and environmental public services supply: Evidence from 289 cities in China
The reasonable division of intergovernmental environmental affairs is the institutional basis for solving environmental pollution problems. This paper conducts an empirical test using panel data from cities in China. We find that: (a) environmental decentralization significantly improves the supply efficiency of environmental public services (ESE). It's mainly because of the increased capacity for green technology innovation and urban environmental infrastructure development brought about by environmental decentralization. (b) Environmental decentralization will improve the ESE more effectively in regions with the central government acting as a binding force, high environmental preferences, governance capacity of local governments, and pollutant emission intensity. (c) Higher promotion incentives for officials may distort the pollution control effect of environmental decentralization and inhibit the ESE. Appropriate central government transfer payments can better utilize the positive role of environmental decentralization.
期刊介绍:
Energy & Environment is an interdisciplinary journal inviting energy policy analysts, natural scientists and engineers, as well as lawyers and economists to contribute to mutual understanding and learning, believing that better communication between experts will enhance the quality of policy, advance social well-being and help to reduce conflict. The journal encourages dialogue between the social sciences as energy demand and supply are observed and analysed with reference to politics of policy-making and implementation. The rapidly evolving social and environmental impacts of energy supply, transport, production and use at all levels require contribution from many disciplines if policy is to be effective. In particular E & E invite contributions from the study of policy delivery, ultimately more important than policy formation. The geopolitics of energy are also important, as are the impacts of environmental regulations and advancing technologies on national and local politics, and even global energy politics. Energy & Environment is a forum for constructive, professional information sharing, as well as debate across disciplines and professions, including the financial sector. Mathematical articles are outside the scope of Energy & Environment. The broader policy implications of submitted research should be addressed and environmental implications, not just emission quantities, be discussed with reference to scientific assumptions. This applies especially to technical papers based on arguments suggested by other disciplines, funding bodies or directly by policy-makers.