工会和违反债务契约*

Guangzi Li, Yili Lian, Yi Zhang
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摘要

摘要本研究探讨工会与企业违反债务契约决策之间的关系。我们发现,高工会化率的企业比低工会化率的企业更有可能违反债务契约。对于现金储备较大的公司,这种关系更强。我们的分析还显示,违反债务契约导致罢工的可能性较低。此外,我们发现工会化程度高的企业在违反契约前的财务状况优于工会化程度低的企业。我们的研究证实了已有的文献,表明契约违约后的长期异常股票收益显著为正。然而,我们的研究结果也表明,与低工会化的公司相比,高工会化的公司的股票回报更小。此外,我们提供的证据表明,工会化程度高的公司在违反契约之前往往会向下操纵收益。这些发现表明,企业可能在战略上违反债务契约,以获得讨价还价的灵活性,并迫使工会在随后的谈判中做出让步。关键词:工会工会选举债务契约违反契约盈余管理分类:G31G32J51披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。注1 http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/styled-9/styled-11/index.html.2违反公约的情况在季度报告中披露,因此季度报告中披露的违反公约的日期可能与实际发生的日期不同。我们遵循Nini, Smith和Sufi (Citation2012),并根据季度报告中违反契约的披露日期计算违反契约后的长期股票回报。作者简介李光子,中国社会科学院金融研究所教授。廉一力,美国加州州立大学斯坦尼斯劳斯分校金融学副教授。张毅,西南财经大学金融学副教授。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Labor unions and debt covenant violations*
AbstractThis study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.KEYWORDS: Labor unionunion electiondebt covenantcovenant violationearnings managementJEL CLASSIFICATIONS: G31G32J51 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/styled-9/styled-11/index.html.2 Covenant violation is disclosed in quarterly reports, thus the date of covenant violation disclosed in quarterly report may differ from the date when the violation actually took place. We follow Nini, Smith, and Sufi (Citation2012) and calculate the long-term stock return after covenant violations based on the disclosure date of covenant violation in quarterly reports.Additional informationNotes on contributorsGuangzi LiGuagzi Li is a professor at Institute of Finance and Banking at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.Yili LianYili Lian is an associate professor of finance at California State University at Stanislaus.Yi ZhangYi Zhang is an associate professor of finance at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.
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