Workplace democracy in action? Assessing employee board representation in Australian government agencies

Abstract Various scholars and political actors advocate workplace democratisation to give employees greater influence over decision‐making. Many suggest employee board representation (EBR) as a mechanism to facilitate this, but some question how influential employee board representatives (EBRs) are and whether they represent their colleagues’ views. This study investigates the extent to which EBR contributes to workplace democratisation, via a comparison of three Australian public sector organisations. The study found EBRs exerted significantly more influence at the Australian National University than at the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the Australian Film Television and Radio School. Most EBRs wanted to draw upon staff experiences but their communication with colleagues was often constrained. Variances of influence were explained by the number of EBRs, the actions of the Chair, chief executive officer, government, and other board members. Two findings stand out as unique contributions: the importance of appointment powers to EBR influence in the public sector, and EBRs’ limited influence on labour issues in the Anglosphere due to the adversarial system of labour bargaining being positioned largely outside the boardroom. The study concludes that EBR is a non‐tokenistic form of workplace democratisation, albeit with a specific scope, which has utility within a mix of democratising mechanisms. Points for practitioners Most EBRs exerted a limited or moderate influence on decision‐making, but others exerted more significant influence. They were most influential on matters related to their experience and expertise and were largely unable to influence workers’ pay, conditions, and other labour issues. Most EBRs did not represent their colleagues in a transactional or direct sense, but drew upon their experiences as staff members when making decisions. However, EBRs had fluctuating issues communicating with their fellow employees, largely due to managerial direction around confidentiality. The number of SEDs on the board and the actions of other board members, the Chair, chief executive officer, and the government explained the variances in SEDs’ influence between agencies. This study's findings regarding EBR influence were middling compared to European research, but appointment powers were found to be particularly important in the public sector context. EBRs’ influence was found to be limited on labour issues, suggesting a potential clash between the corporatist inclination of EBR and the adversarial system of labour bargaining prevalent in the Anglosphere. Elected EBRs offer employees a non‐tokenistic form of representation but within a limited scope of strategy and oversight. Given factors that constrain SEDs’ influence and representativeness can be at least partly countered by policy design and political leadership, these findings bolster the policy case for extending EBR throughout the public sector.