{"title":"RSA后门的一种新思路","authors":"Marco Cesati","doi":"10.3390/cryptography7030045","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes a new method to inject backdoors in RSA (the public-key cryptosystem invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) and other cryptographic primitives based on the integer factorization problem for balanced semi-primes. The method relies on mathematical congruences among the factors of the semi-primes based on a large prime number, which acts as a “designer key” or “escrow key”. In particular, two different backdoors are proposed, one targeting a single semi-prime and the other one a pair of semi-primes. This article also describes the results of tests performed on a SageMath implementation of the backdoors.","PeriodicalId":36072,"journal":{"name":"Cryptography","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A New Idea for RSA Backdoors\",\"authors\":\"Marco Cesati\",\"doi\":\"10.3390/cryptography7030045\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article proposes a new method to inject backdoors in RSA (the public-key cryptosystem invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) and other cryptographic primitives based on the integer factorization problem for balanced semi-primes. The method relies on mathematical congruences among the factors of the semi-primes based on a large prime number, which acts as a “designer key” or “escrow key”. In particular, two different backdoors are proposed, one targeting a single semi-prime and the other one a pair of semi-primes. This article also describes the results of tests performed on a SageMath implementation of the backdoors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36072,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cryptography\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cryptography\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography7030045\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cryptography","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography7030045","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article proposes a new method to inject backdoors in RSA (the public-key cryptosystem invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) and other cryptographic primitives based on the integer factorization problem for balanced semi-primes. The method relies on mathematical congruences among the factors of the semi-primes based on a large prime number, which acts as a “designer key” or “escrow key”. In particular, two different backdoors are proposed, one targeting a single semi-prime and the other one a pair of semi-primes. This article also describes the results of tests performed on a SageMath implementation of the backdoors.