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引用次数: 0
摘要
最高法院在“多布斯诉杰克逊案”(Dobbs v. Jackson)中作出的裁决的另一个有问题的方面与源于宪法第十四修正案的实质性正当程序的法律原则有关。这篇文章对正当程序原则进行了深入的研究,并说明了法院在多布斯案中的裁决如何最终限制了这一原则,因此可能无法为限制堕胎提供最有力的法律依据。相反,该条的结论是,根据其最初的公共含义解释正当程序条款将解决与实质性正当程序原则有关的一些问题,影响到堕胎以外的其他事项。
Dobbs, History and Tradition, and Substantive Due Process
Another problematic aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson has to do with the legal principle of substantive due process, deriving from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This article provided an in-depth examination of the principle of due process, and demonstrates how the Court’s decision in Dobbs winds up restricting that principle, and thus may not provide the strongest legal ground on which to restrict abortion. Instead, the article concluded that interpreting the due process clause according to its original public meaning would resolve a number of the problems associated with the substantive due process doctrine, affecting other matters beyond that of abortion.