政策漂移是不可避免的,也是偶尔的成功

IF 1.3
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And while this could be a reasonable assessment, Rajesh Basrur's thoroughly researched contribution to neoclassical realist theory, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, reveals serious shortcomings in Indian foreign policy over the past two decades of India's rise. He terms these faults \"drift,\" and it is this Indian foreign policy drift—at times timidity, at times torpor—that Basrur seeks to critique and explain. Briefly summarized, Basrur seeks to explain the dependent variable of India's foreign policy drift—the delta between New Delhi's stated foreign policy aims and its actual choices. Drift is characterized as indecisiveness and treated as generally, though not exclusively, suboptimal behavior. It fits well within similar research on puzzling state behavior such as \"underbalancing\" or neutrality.1 Basrur distinguishes drift from paralysis, noting that there is movement, but it is \"erratic, slow, and uncertain\" (p. 8). He contends there are two sources of drift. Involuntary drift is when domestic politics, specifically weak coalitions, hamstring leaders' autonomy to make bold, decisive moves for fear of small pockets of opposition pulling out of coalitions, which would result in government collapse. Voluntary drift, however, is perhaps Basrur's more novel contribution. Basrur contends voluntary drift occurs when a leader possesses sufficient control over policy but simply fails to execute it by avoiding costly choices or difficult tradeoffs and effectively deflects [End Page 134] responsibility and accountability. Other strands of international relations scholarship might characterize this as poor leadership, whether the failing is a deficiency in charisma, confidence, acumen, or moral fiber.2 The book sets out to test his theory on four major but diverse episodes of Indian foreign policy: counterinsurgency, nuclear deterrence, internal security reforms, and geopolitical realignment. The episodes include India's nuclear deal with the United States (2005–2008), material support for the Sri Lanka's fight against the Tamil Tigers (2000–2009), nuclear doctrinal developments (1998–present), and contentions with cross-border terrorism (notably the 2008 Mumbai crisis). Even seasoned India foreign policy scholars well versed in these episodes can discover new details in Basrur's thoroughly researched empirical chapters, buttressed by 48 pages of bibliography. Basrur deserves credit not only for his rich empirical treatments but also for exploring some of the most consequential episodes in post–Cold War Indian foreign policy, despite some incongruity in each episode's duration, which varies from days (e.g., the Mumbai attack) to decades (e.g., nuclear doctrine deliberations). These cases track neatly with almost all the chapters in former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon's policy memoir, which expertly illuminates many of the convoluted mechanics of India's foreign policy decision-making.3 Because India has been led by a hegemonic political party and strong leader for almost a decade, its coalitional power sharing and the contentious federal politics that shaped its three-decade rise since the 1980s are sometimes obscured or forgotten. Many of the chapters in Basrur's book showcase the dynamics of India's intrastate bargaining with expert scientific communities, technical bureaucracies (like the Atomic Energy Commission), a sprawling network of national security and intelligence agencies, and rivalries between state-level regional parties shaping national-level coalition politics and thus constraining executive decision-making. It is not impossible to imagine the return of coalition politics hamstringing Indian foreign policy ambitions in the future. Another strength of the book is Basrur's employment of diverse empirical methods. Given the inaccessibility of classified government documents, the chapter on nuclear strategy makes smart use of the writings [End Page 135] of several former civilian and military officials to code their implicit nuclear deterrence views...","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/asp.2023.a911623\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success Sameer Lalwani (bio) As India rises in economic and geopolitical stature, it has sought to cultivate an image of a leading power with multialigned dexterity. In a year where India helms the G-20 presidency, champions the global South, caucuses with the G-7, assumes leadership roles in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Quad, and deepens strategic ties with the United States while steadily maintaining defense relations with Russia, one might ascribe Indian foreign policy with a Bismarckian level of skill and sophistication. And while this could be a reasonable assessment, Rajesh Basrur's thoroughly researched contribution to neoclassical realist theory, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, reveals serious shortcomings in Indian foreign policy over the past two decades of India's rise. He terms these faults \\\"drift,\\\" and it is this Indian foreign policy drift—at times timidity, at times torpor—that Basrur seeks to critique and explain. Briefly summarized, Basrur seeks to explain the dependent variable of India's foreign policy drift—the delta between New Delhi's stated foreign policy aims and its actual choices. Drift is characterized as indecisiveness and treated as generally, though not exclusively, suboptimal behavior. It fits well within similar research on puzzling state behavior such as \\\"underbalancing\\\" or neutrality.1 Basrur distinguishes drift from paralysis, noting that there is movement, but it is \\\"erratic, slow, and uncertain\\\" (p. 8). He contends there are two sources of drift. Involuntary drift is when domestic politics, specifically weak coalitions, hamstring leaders' autonomy to make bold, decisive moves for fear of small pockets of opposition pulling out of coalitions, which would result in government collapse. Voluntary drift, however, is perhaps Basrur's more novel contribution. Basrur contends voluntary drift occurs when a leader possesses sufficient control over policy but simply fails to execute it by avoiding costly choices or difficult tradeoffs and effectively deflects [End Page 134] responsibility and accountability. Other strands of international relations scholarship might characterize this as poor leadership, whether the failing is a deficiency in charisma, confidence, acumen, or moral fiber.2 The book sets out to test his theory on four major but diverse episodes of Indian foreign policy: counterinsurgency, nuclear deterrence, internal security reforms, and geopolitical realignment. The episodes include India's nuclear deal with the United States (2005–2008), material support for the Sri Lanka's fight against the Tamil Tigers (2000–2009), nuclear doctrinal developments (1998–present), and contentions with cross-border terrorism (notably the 2008 Mumbai crisis). Even seasoned India foreign policy scholars well versed in these episodes can discover new details in Basrur's thoroughly researched empirical chapters, buttressed by 48 pages of bibliography. Basrur deserves credit not only for his rich empirical treatments but also for exploring some of the most consequential episodes in post–Cold War Indian foreign policy, despite some incongruity in each episode's duration, which varies from days (e.g., the Mumbai attack) to decades (e.g., nuclear doctrine deliberations). These cases track neatly with almost all the chapters in former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon's policy memoir, which expertly illuminates many of the convoluted mechanics of India's foreign policy decision-making.3 Because India has been led by a hegemonic political party and strong leader for almost a decade, its coalitional power sharing and the contentious federal politics that shaped its three-decade rise since the 1980s are sometimes obscured or forgotten. Many of the chapters in Basrur's book showcase the dynamics of India's intrastate bargaining with expert scientific communities, technical bureaucracies (like the Atomic Energy Commission), a sprawling network of national security and intelligence agencies, and rivalries between state-level regional parties shaping national-level coalition politics and thus constraining executive decision-making. It is not impossible to imagine the return of coalition politics hamstringing Indian foreign policy ambitions in the future. Another strength of the book is Basrur's employment of diverse empirical methods. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着印度在经济和地缘政治地位上的提升,它一直在寻求塑造一种具有多联盟灵活性的领导大国形象。在这一年里,印度担任20国集团轮值主席国,支持全球南方国家,与七国集团举行核心会议,在上海合作组织和四方会议中担任领导角色,深化与美国的战略关系,同时稳定地保持与俄罗斯的防务关系,人们可能会认为印度的外交政策具有俾斯麦式的技巧和成熟程度。虽然这可能是一个合理的评估,但拉杰什·巴斯鲁(Rajesh Basrur)对新古典现实主义理论进行了深入研究的贡献,《次大陆漂移:国内政治和印度的外交政策》,揭示了印度在过去20年崛起过程中外交政策的严重缺陷。他将这些错误称为“随波逐流”,而正是这种印度外交政策的随波逐流——时而胆怯,时而呆滞——巴斯鲁试图加以批判和解释。简而言之,Basrur试图解释印度外交政策漂移的因变量——新德里宣称的外交政策目标与其实际选择之间的三角关系。漂移的特点是优柔寡断,并被视为一般(尽管不是唯一)次优行为。这与“欠平衡”或“中立”等令人困惑的状态行为的类似研究非常吻合Basrur将漂移与麻痹区分开来,指出运动是存在的,但它是“不稳定、缓慢和不确定的”(第8页)。他认为漂移有两个来源。“非自愿漂移”指的是国内政治,特别是软弱的联盟,阻碍了领导人采取大胆果断行动的自主权,因为他们担心一小部分反对派会退出联盟,从而导致政府垮台。然而,自愿漂移也许是Basrur更新颖的贡献。Basrur认为,当领导者对政策拥有足够的控制权,但却无法通过避免昂贵的选择或困难的权衡来执行政策,并有效地转移责任和责任时,就会发生自愿漂移。国际关系学术的其他分支可能将其描述为领导力低下,不管这种失败是缺乏魅力、自信、敏锐还是道德品质这本书从印度外交政策的四个主要但不同的方面来检验他的理论:反叛乱、核威慑、内部安全改革和地缘政治重组。这些事件包括印度与美国的核协议(2005-2008年),对斯里兰卡打击泰米尔猛虎组织的物质支持(2000-2009年),核教义的发展(1998年至今),以及与跨境恐怖主义的争论(特别是2008年孟买危机)。即使是精通这些事件的经验丰富的印度外交政策学者,也可以在Basrur深入研究的实证章节中发现新的细节,这些章节有48页的参考书目作为支撑。Basrur不仅因其丰富的实证研究而受到赞誉,而且还因其对冷战后印度外交政策中一些最重要事件的探索而受到赞誉,尽管每个事件的持续时间有些不协调,从几天(例如孟买袭击)到几十年(例如核学说的审议)不等。这些案例与印度前国家安全顾问希夫尚卡尔·梅农(Shivshankar Menon)的政策回忆录中几乎所有章节都有密切的联系,该书熟练地阐明了印度外交政策决策中许多令人费解的机制由于印度近十年来一直由一个霸权政党和强有力的领导人领导,它的联合权力分享和有争议的联邦政治有时会被模糊或遗忘,这些政治塑造了印度自上世纪80年代以来30年的崛起。Basrur书中的许多章节展示了印度内部与专家科学团体,技术官僚机构(如原子能委员会),国家安全和情报机构的庞大网络,以及州一级地区政党之间的竞争,形成了国家一级的联盟政治,从而限制了行政决策的动态。不难想象,联合政治的回归将在未来阻碍印度外交政策的雄心。这本书的另一个优点是Basrur运用了多种经验方法。考虑到机密政府文件的不可访问性,关于核战略的章节巧妙地利用了几位前文职和军事官员的著作来编码他们隐含的核威慑观点……
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success
Policy Drift as an Inevitability and an Occasional Success Sameer Lalwani (bio) As India rises in economic and geopolitical stature, it has sought to cultivate an image of a leading power with multialigned dexterity. In a year where India helms the G-20 presidency, champions the global South, caucuses with the G-7, assumes leadership roles in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Quad, and deepens strategic ties with the United States while steadily maintaining defense relations with Russia, one might ascribe Indian foreign policy with a Bismarckian level of skill and sophistication. And while this could be a reasonable assessment, Rajesh Basrur's thoroughly researched contribution to neoclassical realist theory, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy, reveals serious shortcomings in Indian foreign policy over the past two decades of India's rise. He terms these faults "drift," and it is this Indian foreign policy drift—at times timidity, at times torpor—that Basrur seeks to critique and explain. Briefly summarized, Basrur seeks to explain the dependent variable of India's foreign policy drift—the delta between New Delhi's stated foreign policy aims and its actual choices. Drift is characterized as indecisiveness and treated as generally, though not exclusively, suboptimal behavior. It fits well within similar research on puzzling state behavior such as "underbalancing" or neutrality.1 Basrur distinguishes drift from paralysis, noting that there is movement, but it is "erratic, slow, and uncertain" (p. 8). He contends there are two sources of drift. Involuntary drift is when domestic politics, specifically weak coalitions, hamstring leaders' autonomy to make bold, decisive moves for fear of small pockets of opposition pulling out of coalitions, which would result in government collapse. Voluntary drift, however, is perhaps Basrur's more novel contribution. Basrur contends voluntary drift occurs when a leader possesses sufficient control over policy but simply fails to execute it by avoiding costly choices or difficult tradeoffs and effectively deflects [End Page 134] responsibility and accountability. Other strands of international relations scholarship might characterize this as poor leadership, whether the failing is a deficiency in charisma, confidence, acumen, or moral fiber.2 The book sets out to test his theory on four major but diverse episodes of Indian foreign policy: counterinsurgency, nuclear deterrence, internal security reforms, and geopolitical realignment. The episodes include India's nuclear deal with the United States (2005–2008), material support for the Sri Lanka's fight against the Tamil Tigers (2000–2009), nuclear doctrinal developments (1998–present), and contentions with cross-border terrorism (notably the 2008 Mumbai crisis). Even seasoned India foreign policy scholars well versed in these episodes can discover new details in Basrur's thoroughly researched empirical chapters, buttressed by 48 pages of bibliography. Basrur deserves credit not only for his rich empirical treatments but also for exploring some of the most consequential episodes in post–Cold War Indian foreign policy, despite some incongruity in each episode's duration, which varies from days (e.g., the Mumbai attack) to decades (e.g., nuclear doctrine deliberations). These cases track neatly with almost all the chapters in former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon's policy memoir, which expertly illuminates many of the convoluted mechanics of India's foreign policy decision-making.3 Because India has been led by a hegemonic political party and strong leader for almost a decade, its coalitional power sharing and the contentious federal politics that shaped its three-decade rise since the 1980s are sometimes obscured or forgotten. Many of the chapters in Basrur's book showcase the dynamics of India's intrastate bargaining with expert scientific communities, technical bureaucracies (like the Atomic Energy Commission), a sprawling network of national security and intelligence agencies, and rivalries between state-level regional parties shaping national-level coalition politics and thus constraining executive decision-making. It is not impossible to imagine the return of coalition politics hamstringing Indian foreign policy ambitions in the future. Another strength of the book is Basrur's employment of diverse empirical methods. Given the inaccessibility of classified government documents, the chapter on nuclear strategy makes smart use of the writings [End Page 135] of several former civilian and military officials to code their implicit nuclear deterrence views...
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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