在中间开会?多边发展金融、中国与规范协调

IF 1.3
Susan Park
{"title":"在中间开会?多边发展金融、中国与规范协调","authors":"Susan Park","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a911619","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Meeting in the Middle?Multilateral Development Finance, China, and Norm Harmonization Susan Park (bio) International norms are strong when they are taken for granted and followed automatically.1 Through contestation, norms may erode over time as challengers focus on how to procedurally follow the norm or substantively interrogate the idea itself.2 Some scholars have observed that norms may be contested because actors can seek to reject, revise, or deny the purpose of the norm.3 Yet norms can prove resilient and robust even in the face of opposition, highlighting the importance of structural factors as they relate to a norm's embeddedness, institutionalization, and legal character.4 In the 1990s, China was viewed as a novice in multilateral forums, and it was hoped that China would be socialized into international norm adherence through engagement in multilateral economic and security settings.5 Decades on, China is now promoting and changing international norms within multilateral institutions that may fundamentally reshape how finance, trade, development, and energy policy are practiced.6 [End Page 61] The scholarship on China and norms has emphasized its role shifting from being a norm-taker to a norm-maker.7 This essay examines how China's changing role in multilateral development finance is opening an ambiguous space for the reconciliation of a variety of development finance norms with Chinese practices, specifically through inside and outside pathways that could lead to norm harmonization. The first section looks at how China is fundamentally reshaping traditional, Western-led multilateral development finance. The section examines the institutions created by China to pursue Beijing's own international development agenda. The essay then unpacks how responses to Chinese development finance are reshaping Western activities that open the way for harmonizing some multilateral development norms, such as environmental protection. The question remains as to whether this harmonization process will lead to China leveling up to meet international norms, whether certain norms may weaken to enable China to follow them, or whether China and these norms may meet somewhere in the middle. For decades, international development was driven by the Western-led Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Highlighting how policy norms could be taken up and diffused to borrowers,8 the IMF and World Bank promoted neoliberal \"Washington Consensus\" policies in the 1980s, which morphed into the post–Washington Consensus approach in the 1990s to incorporate good governance, gender, development, environmental, and social protection norms, among others. Although this approach experienced some decline following the global financial crisis,9 the IMF and World Bank remain engaged in maintaining the neoliberal economic paradigm they constructed in their activities.10 International political economy scholars have noted how China's promotion of international development has been fundamentally at odds with the neoliberal prescriptions offered by the IMF and the World Bank that have been greatly supported by the West. At heart, China has [End Page 62] instead promoted a strong neo-statist approach toward development that, while emphasizing the capitalist model,11 is underpinned by China's advocation for norms of South-South cooperation, nonintervention, and state sovereignty. Of course, this description only scratches the surface of how China promotes international development. Beyond Beijing's instantiation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the sheer volume and different modalities of development lending by China's banks far outweigh those promoted by multilateral development finance institutions.12 Moreover, the methods for promotion, labeled a \"coordinated credit space\" by Gregory Chin and Kevin Gallagher, demonstrate how China provides credit to both development projects and the creditors and project suppliers. China's comprehensive, wrap-around model of development lending is fundamentally different from the conditionality of the Bretton Woods institutions (with critics arguing that it contributes to China's debt-trap diplomacy).13 Chinese support not only covers single, existing projects but also may lock states into further projects that are not yet viable, leading to loans for resource agreements. More broadly, China may provide lending for states that have never been targeted for Western loans.14 The effects of China's development lending activities have been threefold: first, they have influenced existing multilateral development institutions to change their development lending practices; second, they...","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Meeting in the Middle? Multilateral Development Finance, China, and Norm Harmonization\",\"authors\":\"Susan Park\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/asp.2023.a911619\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Meeting in the Middle?Multilateral Development Finance, China, and Norm Harmonization Susan Park (bio) International norms are strong when they are taken for granted and followed automatically.1 Through contestation, norms may erode over time as challengers focus on how to procedurally follow the norm or substantively interrogate the idea itself.2 Some scholars have observed that norms may be contested because actors can seek to reject, revise, or deny the purpose of the norm.3 Yet norms can prove resilient and robust even in the face of opposition, highlighting the importance of structural factors as they relate to a norm's embeddedness, institutionalization, and legal character.4 In the 1990s, China was viewed as a novice in multilateral forums, and it was hoped that China would be socialized into international norm adherence through engagement in multilateral economic and security settings.5 Decades on, China is now promoting and changing international norms within multilateral institutions that may fundamentally reshape how finance, trade, development, and energy policy are practiced.6 [End Page 61] The scholarship on China and norms has emphasized its role shifting from being a norm-taker to a norm-maker.7 This essay examines how China's changing role in multilateral development finance is opening an ambiguous space for the reconciliation of a variety of development finance norms with Chinese practices, specifically through inside and outside pathways that could lead to norm harmonization. The first section looks at how China is fundamentally reshaping traditional, Western-led multilateral development finance. The section examines the institutions created by China to pursue Beijing's own international development agenda. The essay then unpacks how responses to Chinese development finance are reshaping Western activities that open the way for harmonizing some multilateral development norms, such as environmental protection. The question remains as to whether this harmonization process will lead to China leveling up to meet international norms, whether certain norms may weaken to enable China to follow them, or whether China and these norms may meet somewhere in the middle. For decades, international development was driven by the Western-led Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Highlighting how policy norms could be taken up and diffused to borrowers,8 the IMF and World Bank promoted neoliberal \\\"Washington Consensus\\\" policies in the 1980s, which morphed into the post–Washington Consensus approach in the 1990s to incorporate good governance, gender, development, environmental, and social protection norms, among others. Although this approach experienced some decline following the global financial crisis,9 the IMF and World Bank remain engaged in maintaining the neoliberal economic paradigm they constructed in their activities.10 International political economy scholars have noted how China's promotion of international development has been fundamentally at odds with the neoliberal prescriptions offered by the IMF and the World Bank that have been greatly supported by the West. At heart, China has [End Page 62] instead promoted a strong neo-statist approach toward development that, while emphasizing the capitalist model,11 is underpinned by China's advocation for norms of South-South cooperation, nonintervention, and state sovereignty. Of course, this description only scratches the surface of how China promotes international development. Beyond Beijing's instantiation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the sheer volume and different modalities of development lending by China's banks far outweigh those promoted by multilateral development finance institutions.12 Moreover, the methods for promotion, labeled a \\\"coordinated credit space\\\" by Gregory Chin and Kevin Gallagher, demonstrate how China provides credit to both development projects and the creditors and project suppliers. China's comprehensive, wrap-around model of development lending is fundamentally different from the conditionality of the Bretton Woods institutions (with critics arguing that it contributes to China's debt-trap diplomacy).13 Chinese support not only covers single, existing projects but also may lock states into further projects that are not yet viable, leading to loans for resource agreements. More broadly, China may provide lending for states that have never been targeted for Western loans.14 The effects of China's development lending activities have been threefold: first, they have influenced existing multilateral development institutions to change their development lending practices; second, they...\",\"PeriodicalId\":53442,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asia Policy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asia Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911619\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asia Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911619","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在中间开会?多边发展金融、中国和规范协调Susan Park(生物)当国际规范被视为理所当然并自动遵循时,它是强大的通过争论,规范可能会随着时间的推移而削弱,因为挑战者关注的是如何在程序上遵循规范或从实质上质疑理念本身一些学者观察到,规范可能会受到质疑,因为行为者可以试图拒绝、修改或否认规范的目的然而,即使面对反对,规范也可以证明是有弹性和强健的,这突出了结构性因素的重要性,因为它们与规范的嵌入性、制度化和法律特征有关在20世纪90年代,中国被视为多边论坛的新手,并希望通过参与多边经济和安全环境,中国能够融入社会,遵守国际规范几十年来,中国正在推动和改变多边机构内的国际准则,这些准则可能从根本上重塑金融、贸易、发展和能源政策的实施方式。关于中国和规范的研究强调了其角色从规范接受者到规范制定者的转变本文考察了中国在多边发展金融中的角色变化如何为各种发展金融规范与中国实践的调和打开了一个模糊的空间,特别是通过可能导致规范协调的内部和外部途径。第一部分着眼于中国如何从根本上重塑传统的、西方主导的多边发展金融。本节探讨了中国为追求自己的国际发展议程而创建的机构。然后,文章揭示了对中国发展融资的反应如何重塑了西方的活动,这些活动为协调一些多边发展规范(如环境保护)开辟了道路。问题仍然是,这种协调过程是否会导致中国升级以符合国际规范,某些规范是否会削弱以使中国能够遵循它们,或者中国是否会在中间的某个地方与这些规范相遇。几十年来,国际发展是由西方主导的布雷顿森林机构——国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行——推动的。国际货币基金组织和世界银行在20世纪80年代推广了新自由主义的“华盛顿共识”政策,强调了政策规范如何被接受并传播给借款人8,这些政策在20世纪90年代演变成后华盛顿共识方法,将善治、性别、发展、环境和社会保护规范等纳入其中。虽然这种方法在全球金融危机之后有所下降,但国际货币基金组织和世界银行仍然致力于维护他们在其活动中构建的新自由主义经济范式国际政治经济学学者已经注意到,中国对国际发展的推动与国际货币基金组织和世界银行提供的新自由主义处方在根本上是不一致的,而这些处方得到了西方的大力支持。从本质上讲,中国在强调资本主义模式的同时,推行了一种强有力的新国家主义发展方式,这种发展方式以中国倡导南南合作、不干涉和国家主权的准则为基础。当然,这只是中国如何促进国际发展的表面描述。除了北京提出的“一带一路”倡议(BRI)之外,中国银行的开发贷款的绝对数量和不同模式远远超过了多边开发金融机构所推动的贷款此外,被Gregory Chin和Kevin Gallagher称为“协调信贷空间”的推广方法展示了中国如何向发展项目以及债权人和项目供应商提供信贷。13 .中国全面、全面的发展贷款模式与布雷顿森林机构的条件限制有着根本的不同(批评人士认为这助长了中国的债务陷阱外交)中国的支持不仅涵盖单一的、现有的项目,还可能将这些国家锁定在尚未可行的进一步项目中,从而导致资源协议贷款。更广泛地说,中国可能会向从未成为西方贷款目标的国家提供贷款中国的开发贷款活动产生了三方面的影响:首先,它们影响了现有的多边开发机构改变其开发贷款做法;其次,他们……
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Meeting in the Middle? Multilateral Development Finance, China, and Norm Harmonization
Meeting in the Middle?Multilateral Development Finance, China, and Norm Harmonization Susan Park (bio) International norms are strong when they are taken for granted and followed automatically.1 Through contestation, norms may erode over time as challengers focus on how to procedurally follow the norm or substantively interrogate the idea itself.2 Some scholars have observed that norms may be contested because actors can seek to reject, revise, or deny the purpose of the norm.3 Yet norms can prove resilient and robust even in the face of opposition, highlighting the importance of structural factors as they relate to a norm's embeddedness, institutionalization, and legal character.4 In the 1990s, China was viewed as a novice in multilateral forums, and it was hoped that China would be socialized into international norm adherence through engagement in multilateral economic and security settings.5 Decades on, China is now promoting and changing international norms within multilateral institutions that may fundamentally reshape how finance, trade, development, and energy policy are practiced.6 [End Page 61] The scholarship on China and norms has emphasized its role shifting from being a norm-taker to a norm-maker.7 This essay examines how China's changing role in multilateral development finance is opening an ambiguous space for the reconciliation of a variety of development finance norms with Chinese practices, specifically through inside and outside pathways that could lead to norm harmonization. The first section looks at how China is fundamentally reshaping traditional, Western-led multilateral development finance. The section examines the institutions created by China to pursue Beijing's own international development agenda. The essay then unpacks how responses to Chinese development finance are reshaping Western activities that open the way for harmonizing some multilateral development norms, such as environmental protection. The question remains as to whether this harmonization process will lead to China leveling up to meet international norms, whether certain norms may weaken to enable China to follow them, or whether China and these norms may meet somewhere in the middle. For decades, international development was driven by the Western-led Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Highlighting how policy norms could be taken up and diffused to borrowers,8 the IMF and World Bank promoted neoliberal "Washington Consensus" policies in the 1980s, which morphed into the post–Washington Consensus approach in the 1990s to incorporate good governance, gender, development, environmental, and social protection norms, among others. Although this approach experienced some decline following the global financial crisis,9 the IMF and World Bank remain engaged in maintaining the neoliberal economic paradigm they constructed in their activities.10 International political economy scholars have noted how China's promotion of international development has been fundamentally at odds with the neoliberal prescriptions offered by the IMF and the World Bank that have been greatly supported by the West. At heart, China has [End Page 62] instead promoted a strong neo-statist approach toward development that, while emphasizing the capitalist model,11 is underpinned by China's advocation for norms of South-South cooperation, nonintervention, and state sovereignty. Of course, this description only scratches the surface of how China promotes international development. Beyond Beijing's instantiation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the sheer volume and different modalities of development lending by China's banks far outweigh those promoted by multilateral development finance institutions.12 Moreover, the methods for promotion, labeled a "coordinated credit space" by Gregory Chin and Kevin Gallagher, demonstrate how China provides credit to both development projects and the creditors and project suppliers. China's comprehensive, wrap-around model of development lending is fundamentally different from the conditionality of the Bretton Woods institutions (with critics arguing that it contributes to China's debt-trap diplomacy).13 Chinese support not only covers single, existing projects but also may lock states into further projects that are not yet viable, leading to loans for resource agreements. More broadly, China may provide lending for states that have never been targeted for Western loans.14 The effects of China's development lending activities have been threefold: first, they have influenced existing multilateral development institutions to change their development lending practices; second, they...
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信