Author's Response: Indian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—Refining Neoclassical Realism

Author's Response:Indian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—Refining Neoclassical Realism Rajesh Basrur (bio) The responses to Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy by the five reviewers in this roundtable (Ian Hall, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Jivanta Schottli, Frank O'Donnell, and Sameer Lalwani) have been thought-provoking and have opened up several lines of refinement and inquiry. Additionally, my own reflections on the book several months after publication have led me to ponder its findings as well as the potential avenues it might open up for further research. Let me begin by responding to some critical comments. On the whole, while raising astute questions about the book, all the reviewers were positive about its contribution to the literature, noting the study's theoretical strengths, empirical grounding, and focus on a geopolitical context that has not received much theoretical attention in the global international relations literature. The reviewers have made searching comments and suggestions to consider, however. Criticism is essential to moving the intellectual enterprise forward, and I attempt—I daresay all too briefly—to engage with it. If the reviewer's task is fundamentally to help refine a line of thinking, they have all accomplished it. Hall touches on a vital point in his observation that the distinction between "involuntary" and "voluntary" drift is too sharp given that the reality is more nuanced. In the case of the India-U.S. nuclear deal, he correctly notes that despite the problem of structurally produced delay, the ultimate outcome was shaped by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's ability to override the limitations of his coalition and push through the Indian side of the deal. I may just say that this is a point I made myself in acknowledging that "the material distribution of power is not in itself the only arbiter of outcomes" and that there is also "the vital importance of commitment," which is a nonmaterial factor (p. 71). But there is certainly scope for a more nuanced approach that makes the point more generally with respect to other cases. I am glad Hall has drawn attention to this as it provides the [End Page 139] reader with a clearer sense of how the analytical framework employed in the book might be strengthened. Sullivan de Estrada usefully focuses on the importance of recognizing policy content as a possible factor producing drift. For instance, Indian policy on Russia's actions in Ukraine has clearly been awkward (though not novel if one looks back at Indira Gandhi's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 or even earlier cases). This uncertainty is the consequence of policymakers in New Delhi finding themselves caught between conflicting pressures that are structural (the changing power distribution in global politics) as well as domestically driven (the preference for maximizing policy autonomy by spreading India's strategic bets and establishing linkages with both the United States and Russia). Alternatively, policy uncertainty may be attributed to conflicting "normative imperatives"—a point that is applicable to the confusion in Indian nuclear strategy, which has been caught between the opposite ideational pressures of Gandhian morality and the realist imperative of acquiring stronger deterrence capability. To the extent that this has led to muddled thinking among Indian strategists, it is a valid point. I would nevertheless assert that the fundamental source of voluntary drift in this latter case is policymakers' neglect of the basics of nuclear weapons strategy and their failure to engage with these cross-cutting pressures. Still, Sullivan de Estrada is right in pointing out that ideational factors play an important part in shaping policy, and this is an aspect to which scholars should pay close attention. Schottli raises a pertinent question: To what extent does leadership shape deviation from initial policymaking expectations? I pointed in this direction in both cases of voluntary drift: leadership failings have produced inadequacies in nuclear strategy and counterterrorism, but I highlighted the responsibility of strategic elites in the former case and the public at large in the latter. Nevertheless, the question of relative significance calls for a deeper exploration that assesses the degree of responsibility attributable to different types of actors. This is something that awaits closer...