模棱两可与国家利益:外交政策框架与美中关系

IF 1.3
Wenting He, Wesley Widmaier
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While the administration dropped the crudely nativist language of the Trump administration, it substituted instead the crusading narrative of a global struggle between democratic and authoritarian regimes. This approach would be reinforced by an initially cool diplomatic tone toward China, spanning a tense bilateral meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in March 2021 to the postponement of Blinken's February 2023 visit to China, prompted by the dispatch of a Chinese spy balloon into U.S. airspace. Nevertheless, one could go too far in anticipating an accelerating decline. Despite tensions over specific technological exchanges, the Biden administration has also persistently rejected wider arguments for a \"decoupling\" of the U.S. and Chinese economies, seeking to place a floor under any broader decline in relations. Indeed, in April 2023, [End Page 41] Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen attracted considerable attention with a speech at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies that, while acknowledging the primacy of security concerns, warned against any attempt to decouple the two economies, even holding out hope for the possibility of economic and environmental cooperation.3 Further, in July 2023, Yellen visited Beijing, where she stressed the need for joint U.S.-China leadership in addressing common interests concerning the global macroeconomy, developing country debt, and climate change. This essay suggests that the coexistence of Blinken-styled tensions and Yellen-styled accommodation encapsulates a more enduring feature of U.S.-China relations. Throughout interpretations of policy challenges, \"zero-sum\" framings, which draw on security discourses and trade metaphors to highlight concerns for relative position, have existed in tension with oft-overlooked \"positive-sum\" framings that reflect Keynesian perspectives that stress the need for cooperation in the face of uncertainty and instability. To enable an understanding of these tensions, this essay offers an analysis highlighting the ambiguity of national interests, which are in turn shaped by agents acting as interpretive practitioners who construct events in ways that shape interests in cooperation or conflict.4 To draw attention to the overlooked potential for U.S.-China cooperation, we specifically reference enduring Keynesian frames that lead states to perceive common interests in cooperating to address shared threats. Moreover, even as such predispositions originate in the economic sphere, we suggest that this potential for cooperation may transcend economics on the grounds that Keynesian ideas that lead countries to identify shared interests in global economic governance may also shape interests in global environmental governance. Tracing these dynamics, this essay offers a narrative of U.S. debates on cooperation with China, emphasizing the role of \"New Keynesian\" economist and long-standing policymaker Janet Yellen across economic and environmental issues. The ambiguity of U.S. national interests as the outcome of disparate policymaker preferences can be seen in Yellen's Keynesian approaches toward cooperating with China on global issues, [End Page 42] particularly when contrasted with recent approaches to economic diplomacy that span the Trump administration's mercantilist-styled stress on the balance of payments to the more targeted security-focused approach of Biden administration figures such as Secretary of State Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.5 First, the essay examines mid-1990s debates over the Asian financial crisis, the Kyoto Accords, and China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), focusing on Yellen's Keynesian position that highlighted the existence of potential global public goods; second, it addresses the 2008 global financial crisis, which Yellen's perceived as a possible impetus for joint activism between the United States...","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ambiguity and National Interests: Foreign Policy Frames and U.S.-China Relations\",\"authors\":\"Wenting He, Wesley Widmaier\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/asp.2023.a911616\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Ambiguity and National Interests:Foreign Policy Frames and U.S.-China Relations Wenting He (bio) and Wesley Widmaier (bio) In early 2023, one might have been excused for expecting that a downward turn in U.S.-China relations would only accelerate. 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Indeed, in April 2023, [End Page 41] Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen attracted considerable attention with a speech at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies that, while acknowledging the primacy of security concerns, warned against any attempt to decouple the two economies, even holding out hope for the possibility of economic and environmental cooperation.3 Further, in July 2023, Yellen visited Beijing, where she stressed the need for joint U.S.-China leadership in addressing common interests concerning the global macroeconomy, developing country debt, and climate change. This essay suggests that the coexistence of Blinken-styled tensions and Yellen-styled accommodation encapsulates a more enduring feature of U.S.-China relations. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

在2023年初,人们可能会有理由期待美中关系的下滑只会加速。事实上,两年前的2021年1月,尽管乔·拜登(Joe Biden)在2020年的总统竞选中将唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump)描绘成对“这个国家灵魂”的威胁,但拜登提名的国务卿安东尼·布林肯(Antony Blinken)还是单独称赞了特朗普的中国政策。在他的确认听证会上,布林肯宣称“特朗普对中国采取更强硬的态度是正确的。”在拜登政府的头两年里,美中关系相应地保持了一种广泛的对抗性基调。虽然奥巴马政府放弃了特朗普政府粗暴的本土主义语言,但取而代之的是民主与威权政权之间全球斗争的十字军叙事。从2021年3月在阿拉斯加州安克雷奇举行的紧张双边会议,到布林肯总统2023年2月因中国向美国领空发射间谍气球而推迟对中国的访问,最初对中国的冷淡外交基调将加强这种做法。然而,预测经济加速下滑可能有些过头了。尽管在具体的技术交流问题上存在紧张关系,但拜登政府也一直拒绝接受有关中美经济“脱钩”的更广泛的论点,试图为两国关系的任何更广泛的恶化设定底线。事实上,在2023年4月,美国财政部长珍妮特·耶伦在约翰霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的一次演讲引起了相当大的关注,她承认安全问题是首要的,但警告不要试图使两国经济脱钩,甚至对经济和环境合作的可能性抱有希望此外,在2023年7月,耶伦访问了北京,在那里她强调了美中在解决全球宏观经济、发展中国家债务和气候变化等共同利益方面的联合领导的必要性。本文认为,布林肯式的紧张和耶伦式的妥协并存,概括了美中关系的一个更持久的特征。在对政策挑战的解读中,利用安全话语和贸易隐喻来强调相对地位的“零和”框架与经常被忽视的“正和”框架存在矛盾,后者反映了凯恩斯主义的观点,强调在面对不确定性和不稳定时需要合作。为了能够理解这些紧张关系,本文提供了一个分析,强调了国家利益的模糊性,而国家利益反过来又由作为解释实践者的代理人塑造,他们以塑造合作或冲突中的利益的方式构建事件为了使人们注意到美中合作被忽视的潜力,我们特别提到持久的凯恩斯主义框架,该框架引导各国认识到合作应对共同威胁的共同利益。此外,即使这种倾向起源于经济领域,我们认为这种合作潜力可能超越经济学,因为凯恩斯主义思想导致各国在全球经济治理中确定共同利益,也可能影响全球环境治理的利益。追踪这些动态,本文叙述了美国与中国合作的辩论,强调了“新凯恩斯主义”经济学家和长期政策制定者珍妮特耶伦在经济和环境问题上的作用。美国国家利益的模糊性是不同政策制定者偏好的结果,这可以从耶伦在全球问题上与中国合作的凯恩斯主义方法中看出。特别是与最近的经济外交方法形成对比,这些方法跨越了特朗普政府重商主义式的对国际收支的强调,以及拜登政府人物(如国务卿布林肯和国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文)更有针对性的以安全为重点的方法。首先,本文研究了20世纪90年代中期关于亚洲金融危机、《京都议定书》和中国加入世界贸易组织(WTO)的辩论。关注耶伦的凯恩斯主义立场,强调潜在全球公共产品的存在;其次,它解决了2008年全球金融危机,耶伦认为这可能是美国联合行动的动力……
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ambiguity and National Interests: Foreign Policy Frames and U.S.-China Relations
Ambiguity and National Interests:Foreign Policy Frames and U.S.-China Relations Wenting He (bio) and Wesley Widmaier (bio) In early 2023, one might have been excused for expecting that a downward turn in U.S.-China relations would only accelerate. Indeed, two years earlier in January 2021, despite Joe Biden's 2020 presidential campaign having cast Donald Trump as a threat to the "soul of this nation,"1 Biden's nominee for secretary of state, Antony Blinken, singled out Trump's China policy for praise. In his confirmation hearings, Blinken declared that "Trump was right in taking a tougher approach to China."2 Over the Biden administration's first two years, U.S.-China relations accordingly maintained a broadly confrontational tone. While the administration dropped the crudely nativist language of the Trump administration, it substituted instead the crusading narrative of a global struggle between democratic and authoritarian regimes. This approach would be reinforced by an initially cool diplomatic tone toward China, spanning a tense bilateral meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in March 2021 to the postponement of Blinken's February 2023 visit to China, prompted by the dispatch of a Chinese spy balloon into U.S. airspace. Nevertheless, one could go too far in anticipating an accelerating decline. Despite tensions over specific technological exchanges, the Biden administration has also persistently rejected wider arguments for a "decoupling" of the U.S. and Chinese economies, seeking to place a floor under any broader decline in relations. Indeed, in April 2023, [End Page 41] Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen attracted considerable attention with a speech at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies that, while acknowledging the primacy of security concerns, warned against any attempt to decouple the two economies, even holding out hope for the possibility of economic and environmental cooperation.3 Further, in July 2023, Yellen visited Beijing, where she stressed the need for joint U.S.-China leadership in addressing common interests concerning the global macroeconomy, developing country debt, and climate change. This essay suggests that the coexistence of Blinken-styled tensions and Yellen-styled accommodation encapsulates a more enduring feature of U.S.-China relations. Throughout interpretations of policy challenges, "zero-sum" framings, which draw on security discourses and trade metaphors to highlight concerns for relative position, have existed in tension with oft-overlooked "positive-sum" framings that reflect Keynesian perspectives that stress the need for cooperation in the face of uncertainty and instability. To enable an understanding of these tensions, this essay offers an analysis highlighting the ambiguity of national interests, which are in turn shaped by agents acting as interpretive practitioners who construct events in ways that shape interests in cooperation or conflict.4 To draw attention to the overlooked potential for U.S.-China cooperation, we specifically reference enduring Keynesian frames that lead states to perceive common interests in cooperating to address shared threats. Moreover, even as such predispositions originate in the economic sphere, we suggest that this potential for cooperation may transcend economics on the grounds that Keynesian ideas that lead countries to identify shared interests in global economic governance may also shape interests in global environmental governance. Tracing these dynamics, this essay offers a narrative of U.S. debates on cooperation with China, emphasizing the role of "New Keynesian" economist and long-standing policymaker Janet Yellen across economic and environmental issues. The ambiguity of U.S. national interests as the outcome of disparate policymaker preferences can be seen in Yellen's Keynesian approaches toward cooperating with China on global issues, [End Page 42] particularly when contrasted with recent approaches to economic diplomacy that span the Trump administration's mercantilist-styled stress on the balance of payments to the more targeted security-focused approach of Biden administration figures such as Secretary of State Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.5 First, the essay examines mid-1990s debates over the Asian financial crisis, the Kyoto Accords, and China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), focusing on Yellen's Keynesian position that highlighted the existence of potential global public goods; second, it addresses the 2008 global financial crisis, which Yellen's perceived as a possible impetus for joint activism between the United States...
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Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
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期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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