重新审视工资谈判与就业:集体谈判的可分离性与效率*

IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Claus-Jochen Haake, Thorsten Upmann, Papatya Duman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文运用McDonald和Solow的标准劳动力市场谈判模型,分析了二维纳什议价解(NBS)。我们证明了二维议价问题可以分解为两个一维问题,这样,如果应用NBS,两个解一起复制了二维问题的解。“不相关替代的独立性”这一公理对这种可分解性至关重要。这一结果对实际谈判具有重要意义,因为它允许将多维谈判问题分解为一维问题,从而有助于促进现实世界的谈判。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining*
Abstract We analyse the two‐dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow. We show that the two‐dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one‐dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two‐dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi‐dimensional bargaining problem into one‐dimensional problems – and thus helps to facilitate real‐world negotiations.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
52
期刊介绍: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics is one of the oldest and most distinguished economics journals in the world. It publishes research of the highest scientific quality from an international array of contributors in all areas of economics and related fields. The journal features: - Articles and empirical studies on economic theory and policy - Book reviews - Comprehensive surveys of the contributions to economics of the recipients of the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics - A special issue each year on key topics in economics
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