审查制度与声誉

IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Daniel N. Hauser
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我研究一家公司如何通过投资产品质量和审查,向消费者隐瞒坏消息来管理自己的声誉。如果没有审查制度,坏消息的威胁就会为投资提供强有力的激励。我强调审查制度造成的公司最大均衡收益的不连续性。当审查成本不高时,公司永远不会投资,而耐心的公司的回报可能会降到最低。相反,当审查成本适中时,存在产品质量持续高且收益接近第一优的均衡,如果无法审查,其收益可能超过最大均衡收益。(jel d21, d82, d83, g31, g32, 15)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Censorship and Reputation
I study how a firm manages its reputation by both investing in the quality of its product and censoring, hiding bad news from consumers. Without censorship, the threat of bad news provides strong incentives for investment. I highlight discontinuities in the firm’s maximum equilibrium payoff that censorship creates. When censorship is inexpensive, the firm never invests and a patient firm’s payoffs approach the lowest possible. In contrast, when censorship is moderately expensive, there exist equilibria where product quality is persistently high and payoffs approach the first-best, which can exceed the maximum equilibrium payoff if it was unable to censor. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G31, G32, L15)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
4.20%
发文量
86
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