Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Simeck Using Super Rounds

The Simeck family of lightweight block ciphers was proposed by Yang et al. in 2015, which combines the design features of the NSA-designed block ciphers Simon and Speck. Previously, we proposed the use of linear cryptanalysis using super-rounds to increase the efficiency of implementing Matsui’s second algorithm and achieved good results on all variants of Simon. The improved linear attacks result from the observation that, after four rounds of encryption, one bit of the left half of the state of the cipher depends on only 17 key bits (19 key bits for the larger variants of the cipher). We were able to follow a similar approach, in all variants of Simeck, with an improvement in Simeck 32 and Simeck 48 by relaxing the previous constraint of a single active bit, using multiple active bits instead. In this paper we present improved linear attacks against all variants of Simeck: attacks on 19-rounds of Simeck 32/64, 28-rounds of Simeck 48/96, and 34-rounds of Simeck 64/128, often with the direct recovery of the full master key without repeating the attack over multiple rounds. We also verified the results of linear cryptanalysis on 8, 10, and 12 rounds for Simeck 32/64.