私人贷款协议中的审计师沟通条款:重要吗?

IF 2.7 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Lin Cheng, Jacob Jaggi, Paul N. Michas, Jeffrey Schatzberg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了私人贷款协议中的审计师沟通条款(acp),这是建立贷款人和借款人审计师之间沟通的私人合同机制。我们提供的证据表明,贷款人重视审计师的沟通,并经常指定不同类型的acp,以促进贷款人的监督。由于不同ACP类型之间存在可预测的差异,ACP与更大的贷款、更长的期限、更大的贷款银团、更多的金融契约以及更宽松的金融契约相关。在审查审计工作对借款人的影响时,我们发现acp与较高的审计费用和较长的审计报告滞后有关。这与审计人员对acp施加的诉讼风险的回应是一致的。在第三方诉讼风险较大的样本中,acp与审计工作代理之间的关联增强,表明acp带来的诉讼风险增加与其他审计客户特定的风险因素相互作用。数据可用性:数据可从文本中引用的公共来源获得。JEL分类:M42;D82;G21;G30;K40。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Auditor Communication Provisions in Private Loan Agreements: Do They Matter?
SUMMARY We examine auditor communication provisions (ACPs) in private loan agreements, which are private contracting mechanisms establishing communication between lenders and their borrowers’ auditors. We provide evidence that lenders value auditor communications and often specify different types of ACPs that facilitate lender monitoring. With predictable variation across the different ACP types, ACPs are associated with larger loans, longer maturities, larger loan syndicates, more financial covenants, and greater slack in financial covenants. In examining audit effort implications for borrowers, we find that ACPs are associated with higher audit fees and longer audit report lags. This is consistent with auditors responding to the litigation risk ACPs impose. In samples where the risk of third-party litigation is greater, the association between ACPs and audit effort proxies is heightened, suggesting the increased litigation risk brought about by ACPs interacts with other audit client-specific risk factors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42; D82; G21; G30; K40.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
10.70%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: AUDITING contains technical articles as well as news and reports on current activities of the association.
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