非 CEO 高管的组织内竞争激励与企业劳动力投资效率

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

European Financial Management Pub Date : 2023-10-29 DOI:10.1111/eufm.12463

Zhe Li, Bo Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了非首席执行官（non-Chief Executive Officer）高管的组织内晋升激励（又称锦标赛激励）对企业劳动力投资效率的影响。我们发现，锦标赛激励会导致劳动力投资效率低下，具体表现为与企业基本面所支持的最优净雇佣的绝对偏差。如果非首席执行官的高管不那么热衷于在锦标赛中竞争，这种正相关关系就会减弱。中介分析表明，非首席执行官高管流失率所反映的团队凝聚力下降，对锦标赛激励与劳动力投资低效之间的关系起到了中介作用。我们的证据与锦标赛激励机制功能失调的观点一致，并强调了非首席执行官高管激励机制在企业劳动力投资中的重要性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Non-CEO executives' intraorganizational competition incentives and corporate labour investment efficiency

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Non-CEO executives' intraorganizational competition incentives and corporate labour investment efficiency

This study examines the impact of non-Chief Executive Officer (non-CEO) executives' intraorganizational promotion-based incentives, also known as tournament incentives, on corporate labour investment efficiency. We find that tournament incentives lead to inefficient labour investment, measured as the absolute deviation from optimal net hiring warranted by firm fundamentals. This positive relationship is weakened when non-CEO executives are less eager to compete in the tournament. Mediating analysis demonstrates that reduced team cohesion, captured by non-CEO executive turnover, mediates the relationship between tournament incentives and labour investment inefficiency. Our evidence is consistent with the dysfunctional view of tournament incentives and highlights the importance of non-CEO executives' incentives in corporate labour investment.

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来源期刊

European Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.30

自引率

18.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： European Financial Management publishes the best research from around the world, providing a forum for both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of modern corporation and financial institutions. The journal publishes signficant new finance research on timely issues and highlights key trends in Europe in a clear and accessible way, with articles covering international research and practice that have direct or indirect bearing on Europe.