审计师重要性披露与投资者信任:如何应对披露要求的条件风险

IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Mackenzie M. Festa, Megan M. Jones, Patrick D. Witz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究为研究与审计师量化重要性披露相关的收益和成本的文献做出了贡献。我们进行了一项实验,以检验与此类披露相关的条件风险:对盈余管理(一种定性担忧)高度关注的投资者将过于依赖定量门槛,从而失去对审计的信任。该实验操纵了(1)投资者对盈余管理的关注程度是高还是低,以及(2)审计师是否提供了量化的重要性披露。我们发现,当投资者高度关注盈余管理时,量化重要性披露会误导投资者。具体来说,投资者失去了对审计师识别错误的能力的信任,这些错误在数量上很小,但从定性的角度来看很重要。第二个实验进一步表明,审计师提供详细的、而不是名义上的、定性的重要性披露,可以减轻这种有条件的风险。我们的研究对财务披露、重要性和投资者行为的实践和文献有所贡献。数据可用性:数据可根据要求从作者处获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Auditor Materiality Disclosures and Investor Trust: How to Address Conditional Risks of Disclosure Mandates
ABSTRACT This study contributes to the literature examining the benefits and costs associated with auditor quantitative materiality disclosures. We conduct an experiment to examine a conditional risk associated with such disclosures: that investors with heightened concerns about earnings management, a qualitative concern, will anchor too strongly to the quantitative threshold and lose trust in the audit. The experiment manipulates (1) whether investor concerns about earnings management are low or high and (2) whether auditors provide a quantitative materiality disclosure. We find that quantitative materiality disclosures mislead investors when they have high concerns about earnings management. Specifically, investors lose trust in the auditor’s ability to identify errors that are quantitatively small, but important from a qualitative perspective. A second experiment further suggests that auditors’ provision of detailed, rather than nominal, qualitative materiality disclosures can mitigate this conditional risk. Our study contributes to practice and literature on financial disclosure, materiality, and investor behavior. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.70
自引率
4.80%
发文量
11
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