资本约束供应链中CVaR准则下风险规避供应商的最优融资策略

IF 2.7 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Boshi Tian, Yuanxin Lu, Liangwei Yu, Xiaoxing Chang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文重点分析了供应商对部分信用担保(PCG)和贸易信用融资(TCF)两种融资方式的风险偏好。利用条件风险价值(CVaR)准则,研究了在需求分布随失败率增加的情况下,供应链各成员的均衡解和最优融资策略。首先,给出了风险厌恶型供应商批发价格的解析解,并证明了最优批发价格的风险厌恶水平和初始资本降低,信用担保比率增加。在此基础上,推导出了供应商和零售商在不同情况下的最优融资策略。然而,值得注意的是,结果揭示了与PCG相关的潜在权衡。与风险中性供应商相比,风险厌恶型供应商可能更倾向于提供PCG,但这种融资选择会对供应商的效用和零售商的预期利润产生负面影响。最后,我们说明了最优融资策略是如何随着风险规避水平和信用担保比率的变化而变化的,并给出了供应商和零售商的双赢局面。关键词:供应链管理企业风险规避态度部分信用保证贸易信用披露声明作者未发现潜在利益冲突注1 https://www.leiphone.com/category/industrynews/PHJfNRQtmboIM9cE.html2 http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201705/19/t20170519_22993865.shtmlAdditional信息基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(批准号:no. 1);基金资助:21BGL125),国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:21BGL125);湖南省自然科学基金项目(批准号:116001142);2021 jj40136)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal financing strategies for a risk-averse supplier under the CVaR criterion in a capital-constrained supply chain
AbstractWe focus on analyzing the risk preferences of suppliers regarding two types of financing: partial credit guarantee (PCG) and trade credit financing (TCF). Using the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion, we study each supply chain member’s equilibrium solution and optimal financing strategy under the assumption of demand distributions with an increasing failure rate. Initially, we present an analytical solution of the risk-averse supplier’s wholesale price, and prove that the optimal wholesale price decreases in the risk-averse level and initial capital, and increases in the credit guarantee ratio. Furthermore, we derive optimal financing strategies for both the supplier and the retailer under various circumstances. However, it is important to note that the results reveal a potential trade-off associated with PCG. While risk-averse suppliers may be more inclined to provide PCG compared to risk-neutral suppliers, this financing option can negatively impact the supplier’s utility and the expected profits of the retailers. Finally, we illustrate how the optimal financing strategies shift in response to changes in the risk-averse level and credit guarantee ratio, and present the win-win situations for the supplier and the retailer.Keywords: Supply chain managementrisk-averse attitudepartial credit guaranteetrade credit Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 https://www.leiphone.com/category/industrynews/PHJfNRQtmboIM9cE.html2 http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201705/19/t20170519_22993865.shtmlAdditional informationFundingThis work was supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant no. 21BGL125), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant no. 11601142), the Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province (Grant no. 2021JJ40136).
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来源期刊
Journal of the Operational Research Society
Journal of the Operational Research Society 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
13.90%
发文量
144
审稿时长
7.3 months
期刊介绍: JORS is an official journal of the Operational Research Society and publishes original research papers which cover the theory, practice, history or methodology of OR.
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