皮尔斯论模糊与常识

IF 0.2 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.59.2.01

Francesco Bellucci, Matteo Santarelli

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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要:《实用主义问题》(1905)收录了皮尔斯“批判常识主义”学说的唯一出版版本。该学说的一个主张是，常识信仰总是模糊的。在本文中，我们试图解释这一说法。我们首先对“实用主义问题”的草稿进行语言学上的重建，并比较皮尔斯在这些草稿中对批判性常识主义的几个连续阐述。然后，我们考察了皮尔斯的模糊理论;我们展示了模糊的“主观性”和“谓语性”两种类型，并且皮尔斯根据三种不同的模型来解释谓语性模糊。最后，我们评估在何种意义上，即根据三种模式中的哪一种，常识信念可以说总是模糊的。

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Peirce on Vagueness and Common Sense

Abstract: "Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) contains the only published version of Peirce's doctrine of "critical common-sensism." One of the claims of that doctrine is that common sense beliefs are invariably vague. In this paper, we seek to explain this claim. We begin by providing a philological reconstruction of the drafts of "Issues of Pragmaticism" and a comparison of Peirce's several, successive expositions of critical common-sensism across those drafts. Then we examine Peirce's theory of vagueness; we show that there is both a "subjectal" and a "predicative" variety of vagueness, and that Peirce construes predicative vagueness according to three distinct models. Finally, we assess in what sense, i.e., according to which of the three models, common sense beliefs may be said to be invariably vague.

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来源期刊

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society has been the premier peer-reviewed journal specializing in the history of American philosophy since its founding in 1965. Although named for the founder of American pragmatism, American philosophers of all schools and periods, from the colonial to the recent past, are extensively discussed. TCSPS regularly includes essays, and every significant book published in the field is discussed in a review essay. A subscription to the journal includes membership in the Charles S. Peirce Society, which was founded in 1946 by Frederic H. Young. The purpose of the Society is to encourage study of and communication about the work of Peirce and its ongoing influence in the many fields of intellectual endeavor to which he contributed.