管理层薪酬中的双重所有权和风险激励

IF 5.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Finance Pub Date : 2023-03-10 DOI:10.1093/rof/rfad007

Tao Chen, Li Zhang, Qifei Zhu

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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要本文研究了股东、债权人和管理者三方互动对企业高管薪酬的影响。由“双重持有者”(同时持有公司股票和债券的机构投资者)拥有较高股权份额的公司采用了一种风险较低的薪酬结构:更少的股票期权和更多的内部债务。利用增加或减少投资组合公司双重所有权的金融机构合并，我们确定了双重所有权与CEO薪酬政策之间的因果关系。共同基金代理投票数据表明，股东投票是双持有人实施非凸契约的重要渠道。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation

Abstract This article studies how the three-way interaction among shareholders, creditors, and managers shapes firms’ executive compensation. Firms with a higher ownership share by “dual holders”—institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the company—adopt a less risk-inducing compensation structure: less stock options and more inside debt. Exploiting financial institution mergers that increase or decrease dual ownership for portfolio companies, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and CEO compensation policies. Mutual fund proxy voting data suggest that shareholder voting is an important channel for dual holders to implement less convex contracts.

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来源期刊

Review of Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

7.80

自引率

2.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Finance, the official journal of the European Finance Association, aims at a wide circulation and visibility in the finance profession. The journal publishes high-quality papers in all areas of financial economics, both established and newly developing fields: • •Asset pricing •Corporate finance •Banking and market microstructure •Law and finance •Behavioral finance •Experimental finance Review of Finance occasionally publishes special issues on timely topics, including selected papers presented at the meetings of the European Finance Association or at other selected conferences in the field.