Michael J. Ritter, Joseph A. Coll, Caroline J. Tolbert
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引用次数: 0
摘要
自2020年大选以来,各州立法机构已经提出了数百项法案,规定了新的投票限制,而许多州也让投票变得更容易。这些法律运作的基础是一套规则、程序、技术和地方选举官员,这些规则、程序、技术和官员塑造了美国各地的投票过程(Alvarez et al. 2013,31)。尽管有证据证明选举管理问题,但很少有研究使用两个全国性的综合指数来调查多个州的选举法和选举管理能力对选民行为的综合影响。利用全国选民档案中随时间(2012年至2020年总统选举)的带有投票历史的行政数据,我们测试了选举管理和选举法的影响。通过统计匹配,我们发现更严格的州选举法降低了选民投票率,而更多的选举管理能力对投票率的影响是混合的。尽管相关性较低,但这两个因素可以相互作用,高质量的州选举管理可以部分抵消限制性选举法的负面影响。2012年和2020年的交互效应更强。学者和政策制定者需要考虑选民投票率模型中的选举管理。
Can Election Administration Overcome the Effects of Restrictive State Voting Laws?
Since the 2020 election, hundreds of bills have been introduced to state legislatures with new voting restrictions, while many states have made voting more accessible. Undergirding the operation of these laws are a set of rules, procedures, technologies, and local election officials that shape the voting process across the U.S. (Alvarez et al. 2013, 31). Despite evidence documenting election administration matters, little research has investigated the combined impact of multiple state election laws and election administration capacity, using two comprehensive nationwide indices, on voter behavior. Employing administrative data with vote histories from a national voter file over time (2012 to 2020 presidential elections), we test the effects of both election administration and election laws. Applying statistical matching, we find more restrictive state election laws reduce voter turnout, while more election administration capacity has a mixed effect on turnout. Despite a low correlation, these two factors can interact, with quality state election administration partially offsetting the negative effects of restrictive voting laws. The interaction effect is stronger in 2012 and 2020. Academics and policy makers need to consider election administration in models of voter turnout.