利用战略概况的权力序列对一致性评估进行表征

IF 0.6 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-10-11 DOI:10.1007/s00182-023-00874-z

Francesc Dilmé

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文给出了广义对策中信念一致性的一个新的表征。我们证明了所有的一致性评估都是由策略概况序列支持的，其性质是所有具有消失概率的动作都是根据序列索引的幂函数进行的。这个结果使得证明或否定一个给定的评估是一致的更简单，促进了顺序均衡的使用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles

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A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles

Abstract This paper provides a new characterization of belief consistency in extensive games. We show that all consistent assessments are supported by sequences of strategy profiles with the property that all actions with vanishing probability are played according to power functions of the sequence index. The result makes it simpler to prove or disprove that a given assessment is consistent, facilitating the use of sequential equilibria.

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来源期刊

International Journal of Game Theory 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

1 months

期刊介绍： International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications. It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view. Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.