Locke’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities as Partly Correlated with Kant’s Account of The Thing in Itself

Abstract In this research, I propose intertwined arguments regarding John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Firstly, I will show how Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities causes several problems of perception. Secondly, I demonstrate how such problems affect how we might see this distinction in a way that partially supports Kant’s concept of the thing in itself. To begin, I provide a brief history of the topic before delving into Locke’s description of empiricism and interpreting his writing on primary and secondary qualities. Next, I discuss the problem of primary qualities, considering the interpretation of solidity and Locke’s resemblance thesis. The analysis in the last section demonstrates how inconsistency with the respect to ideas of power and sensation lead us to believe that Locke’s account generates Kant’s account of the thing in itself.