道德真理的一些非自然主义解释中的张力

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Maarten Van Doorn
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近,关于新的形而上学基础概念似乎对元伦理非自然主义具有潜在的解释性回报,有一些令人兴奋的消息。最近,关于非自然主义是否因为一些自成一派的本体论而令人难以置信地认为某些行为是错误的争论也高涨起来。作为回应,有人声称,一旦我们对道德法则在非自然主义上的基础作用有了足够清晰的认识,这就不是(令人反感的)事实。我认为,这一举动与非自然主义友好的道德法则的某些限制是不一致的,因为它们必须做非自然主义在其他地方要求它们做的解释性工作。换句话说,在对监督性反对的基础回应与对规范性反对的某些回应所隐含的基础结构之间存在张力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Tension in Some Non-Naturalistic Explanations of Moral Truths
Recently, there has been some excitement about the potential explanatory payoffs the newish metaphysical notion of grounding seems to have for metaethical non-naturalism. There has also been a recent upsurge in the debate about whether non-naturalism is implausibly committed to some acts being wrong because of some sui generis piece of ontology. It has, in response, been claimed that once we have a clear enough picture of the grounding role of moral laws on non-naturalism, this is not (objectionably) so. This move, I argue, is inconsistent with certain constraints on what non-naturalist-friendly moral laws must be for them to do the explanatory work non-naturalism requires of them elsewhere. In other words, there is tension between the grounding reply to the supervenience objection and the grounding structure implied by some responses to the normative objection.
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CiteScore
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