北韩对韩美同盟的反应。联合军演与谈判行为

Ankook Yoon
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引用次数: 0

摘要

朝鲜以韩美联合军演为借口,多次单方面中断南北对话。本研究旨在揭示朝鲜有意参与谈判行为,以确保谈判中的杠杆作用。为此,本研究将韩美联合军演期间的南北协商案例分为南北协商案例和正常进展案例进行了分析。韩美联合军演仅限于大规模联合演习(如FS和UFS)。考虑到朝鲜最高领导人的影响力,我们将分析时期分为金日成、金正日和金正恩统治时期。因此,我们得出了以下四点教训。首先,北韩在同一韩美联合军演期间也进行南北协商,或者有时采取不一致的协商行为。第二,北韩将联合军演期间中断的南北协商作为拖延时间的手段,在军演结束后重启协商,但需要相当长的时间。第三,与2006年第一次核试验后的韩美联合军演相比,朝鲜更倾向于中断南北谈判。基于这四个教训,我们认为朝鲜利用韩美联合军演作为谈判的杠杆。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
North Korea’s reaction to ROK-U.S. Joint Military Exercises and negotiation behavior
North Korea unilaterally suspended inter-Korean dialogue several times under the pretext of the ROK-US combined military exercise. This study aims to reveal that North Korea intends to engage in negotiating behavior to secure leverage in negotiations. To this end, this study analyzed the cases of inter-Korean negotiations during the ROK-US combined military exercise by dividing into cases of inter-Korean negotiations and cases of normal progress. The ROK-US combined military exercises were limited to large-scale joint exercises (such as FS and UFS). We set the analysis period was divided into Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un’s reign in consideration of the influence of North Korea’s supreme leaders. As a result, we derived the following four lessons. First, North Korea carried out inter-Korean negotiations even during the same ROK-US combined military exercise period or sometimes engaged in inconsistent negotiation behavior. Second, North Korea used inter-Korean negotiations, which were suspended during the joint military exercise, as a means of buying time by resuming them after the military exercise, but after a considerable period of time. Third, North Korea tends to suspend inter-Korean negotiations more than it does during the ROK-US combined military exercise since its first nuclear test in 2006. Based on these four lessons, we believe that North Korea has used the ROK-US combined military exercise as a leverage for negotiations.
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