谁为环境政策买单?商业权力与国家级气候政策设计*

IF 4.1 2区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Joshua A. Basseches
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引用次数: 0

摘要

私人行为者在多大程度上以及通过何种方式影响公共政策?由于行为者倾向于模糊或歪曲其政策偏好,以及难以将政策实质付诸实施,对这些问题的研究变得复杂。本理论构建研究使用定性方法和多种证据来源的三角测量来减轻这些挑战。面对州级气候和可再生能源政策设计中令人困惑的变化模式,我展示了一个关注商业行为者经济动机偏好的二维框架如何解释政策设计。根据政策文本、档案文件和111个以政策为重点的访谈,我发现商业偏好是碎片化的,但在每种情况下,单一类型的私人行为者——投资者所有的公用事业公司——最终都占了上风,实现了他们的偏好。我将他们无与伦比的影响力的来源理论化,并发现他们的独特性正是使他们强大的原因。我的发现对商业权力的研究和理解公平气候政策制定的障碍具有启示意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Who Pays for Environmental Policy? Business Power and the Design of State-Level Climate Policies*
To what extent and through which means do private actors shape public policy? Research into these questions has been complicated by actors’ tendency to obscure or misrepresent their policy preferences and by the difficulty of operationalizing policy substance. This theory-building study uses qualitative methods and triangulation of multiple sources of evidence to mitigate these challenges. Confronted with puzzling patterns of variation in the design of state-level climate and renewable energy policies, I show how a two-dimensional framework attentive to the economically motivated preferences of business actors explains policy design. Drawing on policy texts, archival documents, and 111 policy-focused interviews, I find business preferences were fragmented, but that a single type of private actor, investor-owned utilities, ultimately prevailed in achieving their preferences in every case. I theorize the sources of their unmatched influence, and find that their distinctiveness is precisely what makes them powerful. My findings have implications for the study of business power and understanding obstacles to equitable climate policymaking.
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来源期刊
Politics & Society
Politics & Society Multiple-
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
4.20%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.
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