Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
{"title":"通过副本统一公平分配物品和杂务","authors":"Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen","doi":"10.1145/3618116","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1) the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for goods with copies; (2) the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for chores. We establish a tight relation between these issues via two conceptual contributions: First, a refinement of envy-based fairness notions that we term envy without commons (denoted EFX WC when applied to EFX). Second, a formal duality theorem relating the existence of a host of (refined) fair allocation concepts for copies to their existence for chores. We demonstrate the usefulness of our duality result by using it to characterize the existence of EFX for chores through the dual environment, as well as to prove EFX existence in the special case of leveled preferences over the chores. We further study the hierarchy among envy-freeness notions without commons and their α -MMS guarantees, showing for example that any EFX WC allocation guarantees at least \\(\\frac{4}{11} \\) -MMS for goods with copies.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies\",\"authors\":\"Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3618116\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1) the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for goods with copies; (2) the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for chores. We establish a tight relation between these issues via two conceptual contributions: First, a refinement of envy-based fairness notions that we term envy without commons (denoted EFX WC when applied to EFX). Second, a formal duality theorem relating the existence of a host of (refined) fair allocation concepts for copies to their existence for chores. We demonstrate the usefulness of our duality result by using it to characterize the existence of EFX for chores through the dual environment, as well as to prove EFX existence in the special case of leveled preferences over the chores. We further study the hierarchy among envy-freeness notions without commons and their α -MMS guarantees, showing for example that any EFX WC allocation guarantees at least \\\\(\\\\frac{4}{11} \\\\) -MMS for goods with copies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42216,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3618116\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3618116","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1) the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for goods with copies; (2) the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for chores. We establish a tight relation between these issues via two conceptual contributions: First, a refinement of envy-based fairness notions that we term envy without commons (denoted EFX WC when applied to EFX). Second, a formal duality theorem relating the existence of a host of (refined) fair allocation concepts for copies to their existence for chores. We demonstrate the usefulness of our duality result by using it to characterize the existence of EFX for chores through the dual environment, as well as to prove EFX existence in the special case of leveled preferences over the chores. We further study the hierarchy among envy-freeness notions without commons and their α -MMS guarantees, showing for example that any EFX WC allocation guarantees at least \(\frac{4}{11} \) -MMS for goods with copies.
期刊介绍:
The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.