ES风险与股东声音

IF 6.8 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Financial Studies Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhad033

Yazhou Ellen He, Bige Kahraman, Michelle Lowry

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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要本文研究了股东在环境和社会(ES)提案中的投票是否对企业的ES风险具有信息性。ES提案的独特之处在于它们几乎总是失败。我们考察了共同基金对这些失败提案的支持是否包含了公司所面临的社会责任风险的信息。对失败的ES提案的较高支持可以预测后续的ES事件以及这些事件对股东价值的影响。研究基金投票的详细记录，我们发现一群股东之间的代理摩擦导致提案失败。作者们提供了一份互联网附录，可以在牛津大学出版社的网站上找到，就在最终发表论文的链接旁边

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ES Risks and Shareholder Voice

Abstract We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

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来源期刊

Review of Financial Studies Multiple-

CiteScore

16.00

自引率

2.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Financial Studies is a prominent platform that aims to foster and widely distribute noteworthy research in financial economics. With an expansive editorial board, the Review strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary focus of paper selection is based on the quality and significance of the research to the field of finance, rather than its level of technical complexity. The scope of finance within the Review encompasses its intersection with economics. Sponsoring The Society for Financial Studies, the Review and the Society appoint editors and officers through limited terms.