如何有意识地判断

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Antonia Peacocke
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引用次数: 1

摘要

与普遍的哲学信仰相反,判断确实可以是一种有意的行为。这是因为意向性判断,即使是意旨为p的判断,也不一定是意向性判断。相反,它可以是有意的,只是作为对某些具体问题的判断。判断x是F或者判断p是否。这篇文章解释了这是如何可能的,通过布置一种方法,你可以执行这样一个有意的行动。这种意向性判断的模式与以下事实并不矛盾,即判断是为真理而因果调节的,判断只有在为真时才是正确的。相反,意向性行为的结构解释了意向性判断如何具有这些特征。给出了一个扩展的例子,并给出了故意判断的充分条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How to judge intentionally
Abstract Contrary to popular philosophical belief, judgment can indeed be an intentional action. That's because an intentional judgment, even one with content p , need not be intentional as a judgment that p . It can instead be intentional just as a judgment wh‐ for some specific wh ‐ question—e.g. a judgment of which x is F or a judgment whether p . This paper explains how this is possible by laying out a means by which you can perform such an intentional action. This model of intentional judgment does not stand in tension with the fact that judgment is causally regulated for truth, and that it is correct only if it is true. On the contrary, the structure of intentional action explains how an intentional judgment has these features. An extended example is developed, and sufficient conditions on intentional judgment are laid out.
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CiteScore
1.50
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