数据驱动的包络与隐私政策捆绑

IF 3.8 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Economic Journal Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI:10.1093/ej/uead090

Daniele Condorelli, Jorge Padilla

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文提出了一种通过进入具有共同客户基础的相邻市场(即包络)来保护垄断的理论。在其市场中占主导地位的公司进入数据丰富的二级市场，并参与掠夺性定价和隐私政策捆绑。我们将后者定义为将服务提供调整为订阅允许跨所有数据源捆绑用户数据的隐私策略。从二级市场获取数据可以在数据密集的一级市场获得优势，从而保护占主导地位的公司不被进入，从而损害消费者利益。我们讨论了可能的补救措施，包括数据分拆和可移植性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Data-Driven Envelopment with Privacy-Policy Tying

Abstract We present a theory of monopoly protection by means of entry in adjacent markets that have a common customer base (i.e., envelopment). A firm dominant in its market enters a data-rich secondary market and engages in predatory pricing and privacy-policy tying. We define the latter as conditioning service provision to the subscription of a privacy-policy that allows bundling of user data across all sources. Acquiring data from the secondary market confers an advantage in the data-intensive primary market that shields the dominant firm from entry, thus harming consumers. We discuss potential remedies, including data unbundling and portability.

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来源期刊

Economic Journal ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

6.60

自引率

3.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Economic Journal is the Royal Economic Society''s flagship title, and is one of the founding journals of modern economics. Over the past 125 years the journal has provided a platform for high quality and imaginative economic research, earning a worldwide reputation excellence as a general journal publishing papers in all fields of economics for a broad international readership. It is invaluable to anyone with an active interest in economic issues and is a key source for professional economists in higher education, business, government and the financial sector who want to keep abreast of current thinking in economics.