COVID-19 大流行期间的专业财务咨询和投资者行为

Zhikun Liu, Michael Finke, David Blanchett
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引用次数: 0

摘要

员工通常会被默认为同质的被动投资,如目标日期基金,或者是提供个性化服务和顾问服务的管理账户。目标日期基金投资者的较高业绩表明,无需投资者主动监控的被动默认投资可能会带来行为上的好处。在市场下跌后,与人工顾问的接触以及与员工风险偏好相匹配的资产配置也能帮助投资者避免交易。本文探讨了在 COVID-19 大流行期间,500 万美国 DC 参与者的交易活动与寻求建议行为之间的关系,并将自我指导者和目标日期基金投资者与使用管理账户服务的投资者进行了比较。我们发现,使用目标日期基金的参与者在市场暴跌期间打电话的可能性较低。管理账户的参与者在寻求建议后进行交易的可能性最小。这些发现与以下假设相吻合:在主动选择会损害结果的情况下,被动默认可以改善结果,而获得建议的个性化默认可以帮助参与者避免投资失误。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Professional financial advice and investor behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic

Employees are commonly defaulted into either a homogeneous passive investment such as a target-date fund, or into a managed account that offers personalization and access to an advisor. Higher performance among investors in target-date funds suggests a possible behavioral benefit of a passive default that requires no active monitoring by investors. Access to a human advisor and an asset allocation matched to employee risk preferences can also help investors avoid trading after a market decline. This paper explores the relationship between trading activity and advice-seeking behavior among 5 million US DC participants during the COVID-19 pandemic, comparing self-directors and target-date fund investors to those using managed accounts service. We find participants who use target-date funds are less likely to phone during a market crash. Participants in managed accounts are the least likely to trade after seeking advice. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that passive default can improve outcomes where active choice can harm outcomes, and personalized defaults with access to advice can help participants avoid investment mistakes.

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