货币政策的最优前瞻指引:央行能否用预测影响公众?

IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Christian Jensen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

由于经济结果取决于私营部门的预期,央行可能会试图通过发布关键宏观经济变量的预测来引导这些预期。我们发现,最优的预测需要误导公众。最优的非误导性预测是时间不一致的。只有在公众的预测较为嘈杂或与实施的政策不一致的情况下,无误导性的时间一致性预测才能改善政策结果。由于公众只有在最容易被误导的时候才有动力听从政策制定者的预测,因此不能盲目地相信这些预测。与此一致的是,我们发现联邦公开市场委员会对美国通胀和GDP增长的预测与专业预测之间存在统计学上显著的系统性偏差。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal forward guidance in monetary policy: Can central banks sway the public with projections?
Abstract Because economic outcomes depend on private-sector expectations, central banks might be tempted to guide these by publishing projections of key macroeconomic variables. We find that optimal projections require misleading the public. Optimal non-misleading projections are time-inconsistent. Non-misleading time-consistent projections can only improve policy outcomes if the public’s forecasts are noisier, or inconsistent with implemented policy. Since the public only has incentives to be guided by policymakers’ projections when most vulnerable to being mislead, these cannot be trusted blindly. Consistent with this, we find statistically significant systematic deviations between FOMC projections and professional forecasts for US inflation and GDP growth.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
59
期刊介绍: Macroeconomic Dynamics publishes theoretical, empirical or quantitative research of the highest standard. Papers are welcomed from all areas of macroeconomics and from all parts of the world. Major advances in macroeconomics without immediate policy applications will also be accepted, if they show potential for application in the future. Occasional book reviews, announcements, conference proceedings, special issues, interviews, dialogues, and surveys are also published.
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