{"title":"另一只看不见的手:作为机构的市场如何传播一致性和估值错误","authors":"Sheen S. Levine, Edward J. Zajac","doi":"10.1287/stsc.2022.0173","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The institutionalized status of markets is undoubtedly due to their presumed ability to aggregate individual bids into a single unbiased estimate of value. While not denying this emergent property of market processes, we propose and test an alternative perspective that explains how market processes can also generate the propagation of individual valuation errors that aggregate into price bubbles. Theoretically, we advance a microinstitutional perspective that draws from social and evolutionary psychology linking market processes to a more general process of institutionalization, whereby individuals seeking the adaptive benefits of conformity may—due to bounded and socially biased rationality—instead generate maladaptive individual and collective outcomes. Empirically, we craft an efficient experimental market and find three sets of evidence consistent with our microinstitutionalization perspective. We first show—at the individual level—that market participants exhibit a social bias toward conformity with the market’s collective valuation, even when the emergent market valuation is demonstrably incorrect. We then show—at the market level—that the range of valuations over time also decreases in a conforming direction, again independent of valuation accuracy. Last, we provide the first experimental test of the long-assumed effect of social ambiguity on institutionalization, finding that market participants’ over-attention to the collective valuation is indeed sensitive to variation in social ambiguity. We conclude by highlighting the relevance of our theoretical perspective, method, and findings for future research on institutions and institutionalization processes, as well as future studies on social influence and conformity-based errors. Funding: S. S. Levine acknowledges research grants from Singapore Management University; the University of Texas at Dallas; and the European Research Council (agreement 695256). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0173 .","PeriodicalId":45295,"journal":{"name":"Strategy Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Other Invisible Hand: How Markets—as Institutions—Propagate Conformity and Valuation Errors\",\"authors\":\"Sheen S. Levine, Edward J. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
毫无疑问,市场的制度化地位是由于它们假定有能力将个人出价汇总成一个公正的价值估计。在不否认市场过程的这种突发性属性的同时,我们提出并测试了另一种观点,该观点解释了市场过程如何也会产生个体估值错误的传播,并最终形成价格泡沫。从理论上讲,我们提出了一个微观制度的观点,从社会和进化心理学的角度出发,将市场过程与更一般的制度化过程联系起来,在这个过程中,寻求从众的适应性利益的个人可能——由于有限的和社会偏见的理性——反而产生了不适应的个人和集体结果。从经验上看,我们设计了一个有效的实验市场,并找到了三组与我们的微观制度化观点一致的证据。我们首先在个人层面上表明,市场参与者表现出一种社会偏见,倾向于与市场的集体估值保持一致,即使在新兴市场估值明显不正确的情况下也是如此。然后,我们在市场层面上显示,随着时间的推移,估值的范围也在一个一致的方向上缩小,同样与估值准确性无关。最后,我们首次对长期以来假设的社会模糊性对制度化的影响进行了实验检验,发现市场参与者对集体估值的过度关注确实对社会模糊性的变化敏感。最后,我们强调了我们的理论观点、方法和研究结果对未来制度和制度化过程的研究,以及未来社会影响和从众错误的研究的相关性。资助:S. S. Levine接受新加坡管理大学的研究资助;德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校;和欧洲研究理事会(协议695256)。补充材料:在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0173上获得。
The Other Invisible Hand: How Markets—as Institutions—Propagate Conformity and Valuation Errors
The institutionalized status of markets is undoubtedly due to their presumed ability to aggregate individual bids into a single unbiased estimate of value. While not denying this emergent property of market processes, we propose and test an alternative perspective that explains how market processes can also generate the propagation of individual valuation errors that aggregate into price bubbles. Theoretically, we advance a microinstitutional perspective that draws from social and evolutionary psychology linking market processes to a more general process of institutionalization, whereby individuals seeking the adaptive benefits of conformity may—due to bounded and socially biased rationality—instead generate maladaptive individual and collective outcomes. Empirically, we craft an efficient experimental market and find three sets of evidence consistent with our microinstitutionalization perspective. We first show—at the individual level—that market participants exhibit a social bias toward conformity with the market’s collective valuation, even when the emergent market valuation is demonstrably incorrect. We then show—at the market level—that the range of valuations over time also decreases in a conforming direction, again independent of valuation accuracy. Last, we provide the first experimental test of the long-assumed effect of social ambiguity on institutionalization, finding that market participants’ over-attention to the collective valuation is indeed sensitive to variation in social ambiguity. We conclude by highlighting the relevance of our theoretical perspective, method, and findings for future research on institutions and institutionalization processes, as well as future studies on social influence and conformity-based errors. Funding: S. S. Levine acknowledges research grants from Singapore Management University; the University of Texas at Dallas; and the European Research Council (agreement 695256). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0173 .