{"title":"行为者对有意行为过程中不希望的结果承担道德责任的可能性:心灵哲学中有意行为和有意识的道德鲁莽行为的研究","authors":"Antonio Sanches Sólon Rudá","doi":"10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this work, I investigate some questions pertaining to intentional actions and consciously morally reckless actions, seeking to answer the question whether it is possible to morally hold the agent responsible morally for the unwanted results arising from his intentional actions. The first conclusion reached was that the result of an action that was not the object of the agent's intention is a mere consequence of the main action, however, the action that provoked it can be characterized as a consciously morally reckless action. The second conclusion is that, yes, the unwanted results arising from an intentional action are also the moral responsibility of the causative agent, therefore, it is reasonable to hold him responsible for this.","PeriodicalId":268271,"journal":{"name":"Aufklärung: journal of philosophy","volume":"63 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Da possibilidade de responsabilização moral do agente por resultados não desejados no curso de uma ação intencional: Estudo sobre ações intencionais e ações moralmente imprudentes conscientes no âmbito da filosofia da mente\",\"authors\":\"Antonio Sanches Sólon Rudá\",\"doi\":\"10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this work, I investigate some questions pertaining to intentional actions and consciously morally reckless actions, seeking to answer the question whether it is possible to morally hold the agent responsible morally for the unwanted results arising from his intentional actions. The first conclusion reached was that the result of an action that was not the object of the agent's intention is a mere consequence of the main action, however, the action that provoked it can be characterized as a consciously morally reckless action. The second conclusion is that, yes, the unwanted results arising from an intentional action are also the moral responsibility of the causative agent, therefore, it is reasonable to hold him responsible for this.\",\"PeriodicalId\":268271,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Aufklärung: journal of philosophy\",\"volume\":\"63 \",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Aufklärung: journal of philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Aufklärung: journal of philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Da possibilidade de responsabilização moral do agente por resultados não desejados no curso de uma ação intencional: Estudo sobre ações intencionais e ações moralmente imprudentes conscientes no âmbito da filosofia da mente
In this work, I investigate some questions pertaining to intentional actions and consciously morally reckless actions, seeking to answer the question whether it is possible to morally hold the agent responsible morally for the unwanted results arising from his intentional actions. The first conclusion reached was that the result of an action that was not the object of the agent's intention is a mere consequence of the main action, however, the action that provoked it can be characterized as a consciously morally reckless action. The second conclusion is that, yes, the unwanted results arising from an intentional action are also the moral responsibility of the causative agent, therefore, it is reasonable to hold him responsible for this.