Contra as críticas comunitaristas de Michael Sandel ao pensamento de Rawls

This paper will investigate one of the main critiques of Rawlsian thought that emerged in the aftermath of the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, namely the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel. According to Sandel, Rawls starts from a radically disembodied subject, a unity of the self, from a human subject as a sovereign agent of choice, a creature whose ends are chosen rather than given. In Sandel's view, the original position is not a contract, but the realization of an intersubjective being.Against Sandel's reading, this paper will argue that the parties in the original position are not the affirmation of a liberal, individualized subject, because they are neither thought of as real persons nor as future persons, just as they do not represent who people really are or their true selfs. The idea is that justice as fairness is based on a normative conception of citizens as free and equal moral persons but does not presuppose any metaphysical conception of person. Thus, it will be argued that from the later works of A Theory of Justice – with the change in the Rawlsian perspective of people, highlighting the two moral powers (rationality and reasonableness), and the idea of full autonomy (belonging to the citizens of the well-ordered society) – the communitarian critiques of Rawls' thought fall definitively to the ground.