{"title":"真理紧缩主义与真理理论语义学:使它们发生冲突的一种方式","authors":"Arvid Båve","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1067","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"108 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Truth-Deflationism and Truth-Theoretic Semantics: One Way to Make Them Clash\",\"authors\":\"Arvid Båve\",\"doi\":\"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1067\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36725,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia\",\"volume\":\"108 \",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1067\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1067","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Truth-Deflationism and Truth-Theoretic Semantics: One Way to Make Them Clash
Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.
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