{"title":"真理的时间:在海德格尔和罗蒂之间的塔斯基","authors":"Barry Allen","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1163","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The idea that truth is eternal is an old one in philosophy, and I do not propose to survey its history here. Yet a sketch of the historical context is useful for my main purpose, which is to discuss the theme of truth and temporality in Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty. Although both philosophers repudiate eternal truth, their reasons for doing so are different, and this difference reveals a probably irreconcilable opposition between Heidegger and the Pragmatist.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"32 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Time for Truth: Tarski Between Heidegger and Rorty\",\"authors\":\"Barry Allen\",\"doi\":\"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1163\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The idea that truth is eternal is an old one in philosophy, and I do not propose to survey its history here. Yet a sketch of the historical context is useful for my main purpose, which is to discuss the theme of truth and temporality in Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty. Although both philosophers repudiate eternal truth, their reasons for doing so are different, and this difference reveals a probably irreconcilable opposition between Heidegger and the Pragmatist.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36725,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia\",\"volume\":\"32 4\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1163\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1163","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Time for Truth: Tarski Between Heidegger and Rorty
The idea that truth is eternal is an old one in philosophy, and I do not propose to survey its history here. Yet a sketch of the historical context is useful for my main purpose, which is to discuss the theme of truth and temporality in Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty. Although both philosophers repudiate eternal truth, their reasons for doing so are different, and this difference reveals a probably irreconcilable opposition between Heidegger and the Pragmatist.
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